Against Constitutional Mainstreaming
BertrallL. Ross It
Courts interpret statutes in hard cases. Statutes are frequently ambiguous,and an
enacting legislature cannot foresee all future applications of a statute. The Supreme
Court in these cases often chooses statutory interpretationsthatprivilege the values that
it has emphasized in its recent constitutional jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court
rejects alternative interpretationsthat are more consistent with the values embodied in
more recently enacted statutes. This is constitutional mainstreaming-an interpretive
practice that molds statutes toward the Court's own preferred values and away from
values favored by legislativemajorities.
In addition to providing a novel descriptive framework for what the Court is
doing in these hard cases, this Article offers two normative contributions.The first is a
critique of constitutional mainstreaming. Challenging the prevailing view that
constitutionalnorms should have primary influence on the interpretationof statutes in
hard cases, I argue that the Court should not engage in constitutionalmainstreaming
because it implicitly undermines a centralprinciple of statutory interpretation:legislative
supremacy. The Article's second normative contribution is an alternativeto constitutional
mainstreaming.I suggest that in hardcases the Court should prioritizethe values reflected
in more recently enacted statutes rather than the values emphasized in its own
constitutionaljurisprudence.These evolving statute-based values are more likely to reflect
evolving democraticpreferences than are judicially emphasized constitutionalnorms.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the Voting Rights Act of 1965' (VRA) was at an
interpretive crossroad. Circumstances not foreseen by the Congress
that amended the Act in 1982 opened the door to a new challenge.'
What interpretation would the Supreme Court give to an ambiguous
statute intended to address representational inequality when the
enacting legislature's tool for securing this goal was no longer
available?'
Pub L No 89-110,79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1973 et seq.
See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 (1982 VRA Amendments), Pub L No 97-205,
96 Stat 131, codified as amended at 42 USC §1973 (1982). The context not foreseen was one in
which there were advancements in residential racial integration but continued racially polarized
voting, such that white voters in parts of the country rarely voted for minority-preferred
1

2

candidates. See John Iceland and Daniel H. Weinberg, Racialand Ethnic Residential Segregation
in the United States: 1980-2000 60 (US Census Bureau 2002), online at

http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-3.pdf (visited Apr 1, 2011) (finding up to a
12 percent decline in segregation between blacks and non-Hispanic whites from 1980 to 2000 in
metropolitan areas); Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily, and Charles Stewart III, Race,
Region,and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implicationsfor the Future of the Voting Rights Act,
123 Hary L Rev 1385, 1395, 1413-30 (2010) (describing the continued persistence of "racially
differential voting patterns" in southern states during the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections).

3 The primary tool that the enacting legislature intended to be used to address
representational inequality was the requirement that under certain conditions states and political
subdivisions draw majority-minority districts-that is, districts that contain a majority of
minority voters. See Thornburg v Gingles,478 US 30,50-51 (1986) (establishing the prerequisites
for a majority-minority district that the minority group be politically cohesive, that it be
sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority in a compact district, and that whites usually vote
as a bloc to defeat the minority's preferred candidate). These districts provided minorities with
an opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. By 2009, increased residential integration made
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In Bartlett v Strickland,' the Court had two choices in interpreting
§ 2 of the VRA to address this challenge.! The Court could have
interpreted § 2 consistent with the norm of colorblindness it had
recently advanced in a constitutional case.' This interpretation would
have effectuated the goal of limiting the contexts in which
government can rely on racial classifications in implementing the Act.
But it would do so at the cost of creating severe obstacles to minority
voters' ability to exercise effective political power. Alternatively, the
Court could have interpreted § 2 to permit race-conscious
enforcement of the Act. This interpretation would have addressed the
concern for fair representation reflected in the legislative statements
of purpose ascribed to a recent voting statute. But it would do so at
the cost of infusing racial considerations into governmental decision
making. Both interpretations would have been constitutional!

it difficult in some places to draw geographically compact districts that would provide minorities
with the opportunity to elect the candidate of their choice.
4
129 S Ct 1231 (2009).
5 According to § 2 of the VRA, as amended in 1982:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color,.... as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that ... members [of a class of citizens protected by subsection
(a)] have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
1982 VRA Amendments § 3,42 USC § 1973.
6
See Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District No 1, 551 US 701,
747-48 (2007) (invalidating, under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, a
voluntary school integration plan on the basis of the colorblindness principle).
7 The recent voting statute reauthorizes § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Fannie Lou
Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006 (VRA Reauthorization Act of 2006), Pub L No 109-246, 120 Stat 577,
580-81, codified at 42 USC § 1973 et seq. Examples of the concern for fair representation can be
found in the Act and in the legislative history surrounding the Act. See VRA Reauthorization
Act of 2006 § 2,120 Stat at 577-78 (recounting congressional findings and purposes); Fannie Lou
Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006 (VRA ReauthorizationAct of 2006 Senate Committee Report), S Rep
No 109-295,109th Cong,2d Sess 2 (2006) (describing the purpose of the Voting Rights Act).
8
The more race-conscious interpretation would have been closer to the fringe of what the
Court considers constitutional, but there is ample evidence to suggest that this interpretation
would have nonetheless been constitutional. In particular, the Court's own test for when
jurisdictions would be liable under the Voting Rights Act for failure to draw majority-minority
districts requires the consideration of race. See Gingles, 478 US at 50-51. And given this
standard, it is not clear why the race-conscious drawing of majority-minority districts would be
any different from the race-conscious drawing of crossover districts, the issue presented in
Bartlett.Given this distinction without difference, it is unlikely that the Court would have found
the latter mandate unconstitutional if, for example, the VRA had explicitly required it.
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However, the norms underlying the two interpretations were in sharp
tension. How should the Court have resolved this case?
The interpretive conundrum presented in Bartlett is not unique.
The Supreme Court often interprets ambiguous statutes in contexts
not foreseen by the enacting legislature.'o When faced with these socalled hard cases," the Court frequently has a choice between at least
two plausible interpretations of a statute. One interpretation accords
with values reflected in subsequently enacted statutes but lies near the
outer bounds of what the Court considers constitutional. A second
interpretation is well within the mainstream of what the Court
considers constitutional but will be less consistent with the values
reflected in subsequently enacted statutes. The Court's choice of
interpretation is important because the legislature, given its extensive
agenda, will rarely revisit the decision. As a result, the Court's
interpretation is likely to set a statute on a long-lasting, pathdependent course.1
A closely divided Court in Bartlett settled on the more colorblind
interpretation of § 2. I call the interpretive practice that Bartlett
exemplifies "constitutional mainstreaming." Under this approach, the
Court interprets an ambiguous statute in unforeseen contexts to
accord with the evolving values that it has emphasized in its decisions
interpreting the Constitution but in a manner that conflicts with the
values reflected in subsequent legislative enactments. Constitutional
mainstreaming reflects the efforts of the Court to read a statute so
that it fits more comfortably within a zone of constitutional
jurisprudence-a zone constructed from a reasonably consistent set of
decisions in the Court's constitutional cases-that evidence the extent
to which the Court itself has privileged one competing constitutional
value over another. Importantly, the constitutional mainstream does
not represent the entire domain of possible statutory interpretations
that are constitutional. When interpreting ambiguous statutes in
9 During the past two terms, two other landmark cases have presented interpretive
challenges similar to those in Bartlett. See generally Skilling v United States, 130 S Ct 2896 (2010)
(involving the interpretation of the honest services fraud statute, 18 USC § 1346); Ricci v
DeStefano, 129 S Ct 2658 (2009) (involving the interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
10 Unforeseen circumstances can arise for a variety of reasons, including changes to the
Constitution, society, and technology, as well as judicial interpretations not anticipated
by the enacting legislature. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex L Rev 1165,
1175-79 (1993).
1t See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81 (Harvard 1978). These "hard cases"
present "one of the most vexing problems in the theory of statutory interpretation." Daniel A.
Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice:A CriticalIntroduction 106 (Chicago 1991).
12 The constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment combined with
congressional procedural obstacles to bill passage make it difficult to enact or amend statutes.
See Walter J. Oleszek, CongressionalProceduresand the Policy Process 1 (CQ 8th ed 2011).
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unforeseen contexts, however, the Court will often favor interpretations
that fit statutes more neatly into its constitutional mainstream and away
from the fringe of what it considers constitutional."
In this Article, I introduce constitutional mainstreaming as a
novel descriptive framework for how the Court is interpreting statutes
in hard cases. In addition, I offer two normative contributions to this
important statutory-interpretive debate. The first is a critique of the
practice of constitutional mainstreaming, building on the theory of
constitutional
Although
interpretation.1
statutory
dynamic
the practice
theory,
dynamic
mainstreaming is implicitly endorsed by
is inconsistent with the theory's own commitment to legislative
supremacy. Dynamic statutory interpretation theory suggests that
when interpreting ambiguous statutes in unforeseen contexts, the
Court should look to evolving, present-day public values derived from
the Constitution, statutes, and the common law." The theory, which in
one common formulation defines public values as "legal norms and
principles that form fundamental underlying precepts of our polity,""
contends that the Court should prioritize values reflected in the
Constitution over values reflected in statutes because Constitutionbased values are "fundamentally 'constitutive' of our public society.""
13 The Court employs several tools to engage in constitutional mainstreaming, including
the modern constitutional avoidance canon, the clear statement rules, and the manipulation of
indeterminate evidence of the enacting legislature's intent and purpose to identify a meaning
that accords with values that the Court emphasizes in the Constitution. See Part II.A. This
Article focuses on the Supreme Court's constitutional mainstreaming of statutes. The descriptive
theory is likely applicable to other courts, but due to limited empirical data about Supreme
Court behavior, the question of broader application remains an open one. See Part IIB.
14 William Eskridge coined the term "dynamic statutory interpretation" in his seminal
work in the field, William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U Pa L Rev 1479,
1479 (1987). Other scholars also have developed theoretical insights that are critical to a broader
dynamic statutory interpretation theory. See also Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to
Interpret Unclear Legislation 41 (Harvard 2008); Nickolai G. Levin, Constitutional Statutory
Synthesis, 54 Ala L Rev 1281, 1285-86 (2003); Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes,
70 U Colo L Rev 225, 254-55 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 504-05 (1989); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory
Interpretation,87 Mich L Rev 20, 21 (1988); William D. Popkin, The CollaborativeModel of
Statutory Interpretation,61 S Cal L Rev 541, 627 (1988); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 313-17
(Belknap 1986); Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 31-32 (Harvard 1982).
Dynamic interpretation is now among the leading theories of statutory interpretation, along with
textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, and pragmatism.
15 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U Pa L Rev 1007,
1094 (1989).
16 Id at 1008.
17 Id at 1036. See also Levin, 54 Ala L Rev at 1285-86 (cited in note 14) (arguing for the
prioritization of Constitution-based values because they arise from fundamental law that has
past supermajoritarian support); Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 468 (cited in note 14) (arguing that
the emphasis of constitutional values in the interpretation of statutes serves a constitutionalnorm enforcing function).
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Dynamic theory, however, overlooks an important reality in
making this claim: evolving constitutional values do not necessarily
reflect the public's evolving fundamental values. In spite of certain
salient examples of constitutional-value evolution driven by public
activism, such as the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the
women's rights movement of the 1970s, constitutional values are often
not derived from, and do not evolve through, the influence of broadbased social movements or public dialogue that leads to a rough
popular consensus." Instead, these constitutional values emerge and
evolve primarily through the Court's day-to-day interpretations of the
Constitution, which are usually subject only to minimal and indirect
input from the public through the judicial appointment process. In
these everyday interpretations, the Court often engages in a process of
balancing competing constitutional values contained in the text or
structure of the Constitution. In doing so, the Court chooses which
constitutional values should be prioritized, and to what degree, in its
evolving jurisprudence.
The Court's central role in balancing constitutional values follows
from two constitutionally embedded principles: judicial supremacy
and judicial independence. Because of general adherence to these two
doctrines by the public and the other political branches, evolving
constitutional values primarily reflect the value orientation of the
majority of justices on the Court rather than the majority views of the
public." As a result, the constitutional values emphasized in the
Court's jurisprudence often shift when a new majority with a new
constitutional-value orientation emerges on the Court through either
the judicial appointment process or the ideological drift of pivotal
justices.20 Dynamic theory's incompletely theorized suggestion that the
Court should prioritize Constitution-based values is therefore better
understood as endorsing the proposition that the Court should
prioritize values that the Court itself emphasizes in its own
constitutionaljurisprudence.
Yet according to dynamic theorists' own conception of legislative
supremacy, the Court should act as a junior cooperative partner to the
current legislature, "attuned to [its] current policies, its reliance on
18 Popular constitutionalism describes a broad public role in the construction and
evolution of constitutional norms. See, for example, Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves:
PopularConstitutionalismand Judicial Review 7 (Oxford 2004); Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Transformations 345-49 (Belknap 1998); Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the
Constitutionfrom the People:JuricentricRestrictions on Section Five Power,78 Ind L J 1,2 (2003).
19 The value orientation of a majority of the justices on the Court that is developed in case
law is often shaped and influenced by the preferences of the median justice who supplies the
critical vote for any given majority. See text accompanying notes 65-72.
20
See notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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prior statutes and judicial interpretation of those statutes, and its shifts
in policy directions."21 Underlying this conception of legislative
supremacy is the norm that statutes should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with evolving democratic preferences.22 But when the Court
engages in constitutional mainstreaming, it acts less as a subordinate
institution interpreting statutes to accord with the evolving
preferences of the public and more as a superlegislature interpreting
statutes in accordance with the constitutional values that it prizes.
In addition to identifying and critiquing the practice of
constitutional mainstreaming, the final contribution of this Article is a
normative account of how the Court should interpret statutes in hard
cases. If the Court is to be faithful to the dynamic conception of
legislative supremacy and its underlying premise of responsiveness to
evolving democratic preferences, it must resist the gravitational pull of
the constitutional mainstream. The Court should instead look first to
the values embodied in subsequently enacted statutes, which are a
better guide to evolving democratic preferences, before turning to the
norms that it emphasizes in its constitutional jurisprudence.
Skeptics of such an approach would likely point to public choice
theory to argue that the legislature, in its enactments, is not actually
responsive to evolving democratic preferences. According to the
public choice account, legislative enactments represent deals supplied
by legislators to politically organized special interest groups, which
pay for these favorable enactments with campaign contributions.
Statutes, under this account, are therefore more likely to reflect the
values of small special interest groups rather than the preferences of
the broad public.23 If that were true, then there would seem to be little
reason to prefer statute-based values as interpretive guidelines.
Even if one starts from a public choice-based view of the
legislative process, however, statute-based values derived from
subsequently enacted statutes will still reflect evolving democratic
preferences to a significant degree. The reason is twofold. First,
statute-based values should be derived not from the content of
legislation but instead from the articulated purposes surrounding the
statute contained in the statute's preface, its description of purposes,
and the congressional deliberations about the statute in the legislative
William N. Eskridge Jr,SpinningLegislative Supremacy,78 Georgetown L J319,343 (1989).
See Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutionaland Statutory Interpretation,75 U
Colo L Rev 1,23-24 (2004) (articulating the underlying premises of legislative supremacy).
23
See Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement, in
Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, eds, Research Handbook on Public Choice and
Public Law 20-25 (Edward Elgar 2010); Steven P. Croley, Regulation and Public Interests: The
21
22

Possibility of Good Regulatory Government 18-19 (Princeton 2008).
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history. Second, building on a dynamic described by Jonathan Macey,2 4
I argue that such purposes will usually be "public-regarding" and
ultimately accord with democratic preferences.
The basis for my argument that statute-based values will usually
be public-regarding is that voters are not rationally apathetic and
ignorant, as public choice theory assumes.25 Instead, many individuals
vote on the basis of political information that is distributed to them
cheaply and broadly through campaign advertisements.2 Legislators
will therefore have strong incentives to hide most enactments favoring
special interests behind a veil of public-regarding purposes that reflect
democratic preferences in order to forestall potential challenges by
future opponents that might mobilize the public against them." The
Court should use these public-regarding purposes, which surround
most statutes, as the primary source of statute-based values in
assessing the meaning of ambiguous statutes in unforeseen contexts.
Ultimately, those public-regarding purposes are far better evidence of
the public's evolving preferences than the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. I call this approach of prioritizing evolving statutebased values a "modified dynamic" approach to statutory
interpretation.
Constitutional mainstreaming is especially important to think
about now because we have a conservative Court whose constitutional
norms often sharply oppose the values reflected in the statutory
enactments of recent liberal Congresses. The argument against
constitutional mainstreaming thus matters because it addresses a
fundamental conflict in authority over the interpretation of federal
statutory law: Should the meaning of statutes be rooted in the Court's
reading of the Constitution, or should it be guided by the actions of
Congress? Does the Court's role as arbiter of constitutional meaning
inherently give it the power to shape legislation in similar ways? Or
should the Court step back and cede at least some interpretive power
to legislators themselves? These are important questions that go to the
heart of what it means to be ruled by representative institutions within
the context of a constitutional republic. I begin to address them here.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I shows that the roots of
constitutional mainstreaming lie in dynamic theory's prioritization of
Constitution-based values. Part II explains why constitutional
mainstreaming is inconsistent with the dynamic conception of
24
See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory
Interpretation:AnInterest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223,225 (1986).
25
See note 177.
26
See text accompanying notes 180-81.
27 See note 193 and accompanying text.
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legislative supremacy. Part III makes the case for the prioritization of
statute-based values from within the public choice account of
legislative behavior. I then offer a preliminary framework for a
modified dynamic approach to statutory interpretation. Part IV
responds to objections.
I. THE ROOTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL MAINSTREAMING INDYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THEORY
In this Part, I explain the dynamic statutory-interpretive theorists'
view that evolving public values derived from the Constitution deserve
precedence in the interpretation of statutes in hard cases. I respond to
this view by showing that, while constitutional values are sometimes
influenced by popular will, more often the Court's elaboration of
constitutional values is rooted in the justices' own preferences. These
values, therefore, tend to evolve through changes in judicial majority
coalitions on particular issues rather than through changes in popular
will.
The starting point of dynamic theory is that the interpretation of
statutes in contexts not foreseen by the enacting legislature is
inevitable. Statutes are often general and abstract and almost always
have an indefinite life.28 The theory emerged in the 1980s as a response
to the deficiencies of the archaeological and public choice approaches
to the problem of how to interpret ambiguous statutes in unforeseen
circumstances.9 Dynamic theorists analogized the process of statutory
interpretation to the common law and the Constitution, areas in which
ambiguous legal texts are interpreted dynamically "in light of their
present societal, political, and legal context.",o They argued that the
Court in its interpretation of ambiguous statutes is in fact guided by
evolving public values-defined as the "background norms that
contribute to and result from the moral development of our political
community."" The Court derives these public values from three legal
sources-"the Constitution, evolving statutory policy, and common
See William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation48-49 (Harvard 1994).
See id at 12; Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 414-33 (cited in note 14). Under the
archaeological approach, the Court seeks to discover the intent or purposes of the enacting
legislature. In the context of unforeseen circumstances, the Court should imaginatively
reconstruct what the enacting legislature would have done if faced with the particular question.
See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism,LegalRealism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 Case W Res L Rev 179, 189-90 (1986). Under the public choice approach,
statutes should not be interpreted to address circumstances outside the clear language of the
statute. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U Chi L Rev 533,540 (1983).
30 Eskridge, 135 U Pa L Rev at 1479 (cited in note 14). See also Dworkin, Law's Empire
at 313 (cited in note 14); Calabresi, Common Law at 98 (cited in note 14).
31 Eskridge, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1008 (cited in note 15).
28
29
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law" 32 -that are described by dynamic theorists as exerting
gravitational influence on the Court's interpretive choices."
As both an empirical and normative matter, dynamic theorists
argue that the strength of these gravitational influences differs by
source. Constitutional values have the greatest effect on statutory
interpretation because they are "fundamentally 'constitutive' of our
public society."34 Values derived from subsequently enacted statutes
have less of a gravitational pull while the common law, which is the
source of certain presumptions and clear statement rules, should have
the least influence on statutory interpretation.
For dynamic theorists it is almost intuitive that courts when
interpreting statutes in hard cases will be guided foremost by "the
gravitational pull of deep constitutional principles."" As a result, only
a few scholars have addressed in any depth why a court should
prioritize evolving Constitution-based values over evolving statutebased values." William Eskridge seems to make a descriptive claim
about the prioritization of Constitution-based values when he explains
that these values have the strongest gravitational pull on the
interpretation of ambiguous statutes because of the Constitution's
"special coercive force."" He suggests that statutes not particularly
sensitive to constitutional values run a greater risk of invalidation.
Therefore-and here he draws a normative lesson-these values
should "influence -though not necessarily dictate-the direction in
which the interpreter is willing to bend the statute."
Cass Sunstein also advances an argument in favor of prioritizing
Constitution-based values. He argues that since they occupy the
highest position in the hierarchy of public values, prioritizing them
32 Id at 1009. See also Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 466 (cited in note 14) (suggesting, in a
slightly different vein, that courts should look to the Constitution for "understandings about how
statutory interpretation will improve or impair the performance of governmental institutions"
and "an understanding of statutory function and failure").
33 See Eskridge, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1009 (cited in note 15). See also Calabresi, Common
Law at 99 (cited in note 14).
34 Eskridge, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1036 (cited in note 15). See also Levin, 54 Ala L Rev
at 1283 (cited in note 14); Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 468 (cited in note 14).
35 See Eskridge, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1051 (cited in note 15).
36
Calabresi, Common Law at 99 (cited in note 14).
37 Some advocates of a dynamic approach to interpreting ambiguous statutes in
unforeseen contexts simply contend that the Court should look to values derived from the
Constitution, statutes, and the common law without any explicit prioritization among the three
sources. See, for example, Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons,99 Nw U L
Rev 1389, 1434 (2005); Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy,
42 Case W Res L Rev 1130,1191 (1992); Aleinikoff, 87 Mich L Rev at 59 (cited in note 14).
38
Eskridge, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1019 (cited in note 15). See also Calabresi, Common Law
at 99 (cited in note 14).
39 Eskridge, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1034 (cited in note 15).
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serves a constitutional-norm enforcing function." Similar to Eskridge,
he argues that by "pushing statutes away from constitutionally
troublesome ground," the prioritization of Constitution-based values
"provides a way for courts to vindicate constitutionally based norms
and does so in a way that is less intrusive than constitutional
adjudication."4 '
Most recently, Nickolai Levin has argued that courts should
incorporate the "gravitational force" of changing constitutional
principles because they arise from fundamental law and have popular
legitimacy on the basis of their past supermajoritarian support.42 He
sees the prioritization of these values as an attractive means of
reconciling statutes with evolving constitutional principles. In addition,
he argues that the judiciary has a special competency in the
interpretation of the Constitution and therefore has a comparative
advantage with respect to incorporating Constitution-based values
into statutory interpretation."
Since dynamic theorists have largely assumed that Constitutionbased values should be prioritized over values derived from other
sources, important questions related to this prioritization have been
left unanswered or undertheorized. What does it mean to prioritize
Constitution-based values? How do they evolve? Do they deserve the
primacy that they have been accorded in statutory interpretation?
One can imagine at least three potential sources of Constitutionbased values: the text and structure of the Constitution, the people,
and the Court. No one can take seriously the text and structure of the
Constitution as the exclusive source of Constitution-based values for
use in statutory interpretation, because the text is often too general to
support a particular interpretation of an ambiguous statute. For
example, the text and structure of the Constitution call for the
protection of values as broad as equal protection, due process,
federalism, separation of powers, and the freedoms of speech, of
religion, and of the press. Values at this level of generality will often
provide little direction as to the meaning of ambiguous statutes in a
particularized context. In addition, multiple conflicting values found in
different constitutional provisions can be relevant to the
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. For example, the
40 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 466, 505 (cited in note 14) (noting that the Constitution is
the "first and most straightforward" source of values).
41 Id at 468 (observing that a reason the judiciary is reluctant to enforce constitutional
principles directly is its less democratic "pedigree").
42 Levin, 54 Ala L Rev at 1285-86 (cited in note 14), citing Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously at 111 (cited in note 14).
43 Levin, 54 Ala L Rev at 1286-87 (cited in note 14).
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Constitution's text-based values of equality and federalism are both
applicable to federal civil rights statutes that regulate states' behavior
such as the Voting Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964." And there is no clear, nonarbitrary text-based means to
resolve the conflict between these two values.
Not only is the text of the Constitution an inadequate source of
Constitution-based values, but the process of changing the text
through amendments is not the primary means by which Constitutionbased values evolve." As our fundamental law, the Constitution
incorporates an arduous amendment process under Article V that
requires the approval of a supermajority of both houses of Congress
as well as the states. As a result, in the more than two centuries since
the ratification of the Bill of Rights, only seventeen additional
amendments have been ratified, with several touching on technical
matters that do not inherently reflect the evolution of public values.
To the extent that the text of constitutional provisions is
ambiguous or in tension with each other, the proper resolution cannot
be ascertained through an assessment of how the values have evolved
or which values are preeminent at any particular point in time. As a
tool for the dynamic interpretation of statutes in unforeseen contexts,
the utility of constitutional text as the exclusive source of evolving
Constitution-based values is therefore quite limited.
A second potential source of constitutional values is the people.
Eskridge's description of Constitution-based values implicitly suggests
that these values are derived from judicial decisions that emerge after
a dialogue between the Court and the people. United Steelworkers of
America v Weber 7 is a paradigmatic case of such dialogue. Eskridge's
argument suggests that the constitutional value underlying the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Weber was drawn from
a decade-long "intense public debate" that ultimately reached a rough
consensus on a nondiscrimination principle that sustained raceconscious decision making through affirmative preferences for
minorities.4 In that case, the Court interpreted ambiguous provisions
of Title VII to permit the use of affirmative action by a private
Pub L No 88-352,78 Stat 241,codified at 42 USC § 2000a et seq.
Compare Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary:The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 19 (Harvard 1997) (describing Article V as the exclusive mechanism for
constitutional change), with Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Georgetown L J 657, 668
(2009) (arguing that Article V as the exclusive vehicle for constitutional change does not
describe our actual constitutional practice).
46 US Const Art V (requiring two-thirds of both houses of Congress or two-thirds of the
states to propose an amendment and three-quarters of the states to ratify it).
47 443 US 193 (1979).
48 Eskridge, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1034 (cited in note 15).
44

45
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employer to rectify past discrimination." And a year after the Court
decided Weber, it articulated this value as a constitutional norm in
Regents of the University of Californiav Bakke" when it suggested that
it would approve a limited form of affirmative preferences in
university admissions to promote diversity."
The idea that constitutional values are derived from the people is
closely related to the theory of popular constitutionalism advocated
by scholars such as Larry Kramer, Robert Post, and Reva Siegel.52 For
these scholars, group mobilization and "the evolving political
understandings of the nation" are of unique importance in the
construction of constitutional meaning." In particular, the
Constitution's meaning emerges and changes through a dialogue
between the Court and contemporary political culture; the Court
ultimately interprets the Constitution in a manner that is "responsive
to the nation's political values."" Bruce Ackerman has developed a
more formalized version of popular constitutionalism in which he
draws a connection between the popular will and the evolving
meaning of the Constitution through what he describes as
"constitutional moments."" During these moments, a political or social
movement signals an issue and persuades a majority of the people to
support its initiative through discussions in deliberative forums." The
people then ratify this initiative, and its principles are consolidated in
landmark statutes that endure over time." Examples of these
constitutional moments include Reconstruction, the New Deal, and
49 Weber, 443 US at 197 (holding that "Title VII does not prohibit [ ] race-conscious
affirmative action plans [of private sector employers and unions]"). See also Eskridge, 137 U Pa
L Rev at 1034 (cited in note 15) (stating that "Weber... illustrate[s] a broader way in which
constitutional values may affect statutory interpretation").
50 438 US 265 (1978).
51 Idat307.
52 See, for example, Kramer, The People Themselves at 227 (cited in note 18); Robert C.
Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric
Interpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L J 1943, 2020-23 (2003); Post and
Siegel, 78 Ind L J at 2 (cited in note 18); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 TermForeword:We the Court, 115 Harv L Rev 4, 10-11 (2001); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender
and the Constitutionfrom a Social Movement Perspective,150 U Pa L Rev 297,300 (2001).
53 Post and Siegel, 78 Ind L J at 23 (cited in note 18). See also Kramer, The People
Themselves at 8 (cited in note 18) (explaining that, historically, "American constitutionalism
assigned ordinary citizens a central and pivotal role in implementing their Constitution"); Post
and Siegel, 112 Yale L J at 2020 (cited in note 52) (describing how the Court was responsive to a
mobilized citizenry's advocacy for a new understanding of the constitutional value against sex
discrimination).
54 See Post and Siegel,78 Ind LJ at 23 (cited in note 18).
55 Ackerman, We the People: Transformations at 345-49 (cited in note 18); Bruce
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv L Rev 1737,1761-88 (2007).
56 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations266-67 (Belknap 1991).
57 Id at 267,285-90.
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the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, with the landmark statutes
from these eras serving as effective amendments to the Constitution."
Thus, the process of value evolution under the popular
constitutionalism model is much more fluid and inchoate than that
established in the Article V amendment process.
When combined with text and structure, the account of evolution
through the popular construction of Constitution-based values does
tell a more complete story than one based on the text and structure
alone. However, it is still extremely underinclusive in describing the
universe of means by which Constitution-based values evolve. Popular
mobilizations that lead to the evolution of constitutional text, doctrine,
or landmark statutes are relatively infrequent compared to the
occasions for shifts in the meaning of the Constitution. To the extent
that dynamic-interpretation scholars focus on popular constructions as
a source of Constitution-based values, they understate the important
role of the Supreme Court in the development of these values.
Instead of evolving through the amendment of text or popular
constructions of the Constitution, Constitution-based values emerge
primarily through the Court's everyday interpretations of the
Constitution. These interpretations sometimes resolve ambiguity in
constitutional provisions. But often the Court is reconciling tension
between constitutional provisions along the three main axes of the
Constitution: individual rights, federalism, and separation of powers.5
The Court in doing so engages in a balancing process in which it
chooses which value should be emphasized and to what extent it
should be emphasized in different cases and over time." At times, this
tension is resolved through text or reliance on popular constructions;
but at other times the Court balances constitutional values without
specific guidance from the text, the people, or the other branches of
government.
58 See Ackerman, We the People: Transformations at 345-49 (cited in note 18); Ackerman,
120 Harv L Rev at 1761-88 (cited in note 55).
59 See, for example, Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 S Ct Rev 341,342.
60 Constitutional scholars have recognized that much of the function of constitutional
interpretation involves the balancing and reconciliation of constitutional values. See, for
example, Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 139 (Free
Press 1990); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process 5
(Princeton 1988); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court,1978 Term-Foreword:The Forms of Justice,
93 Harv L Rev 1,10-11 (1979).
61 See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of JudicialReview, 76 U Chi L Rev 859,
863 n 8 (2009), citing Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 574-75 (2005). Departmentalists have
argued for an approach to constitutional interpretation in which all three branches are involved
in the development of the meaning of the Constitution. But they concede that over at least the
past half-century the other political branches have deferred to the Court as being the ultimate
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The Court's resolution of these questions in its everyday
constitutional interpretations is especially resilient to external
pressures because of the doctrines of judicial supremacy and judicial
independence. The doctrine of judicial supremacy, which originated in
Supreme Court case law, posits that the Court "authoritatively
interprets constitutional meaning" and that the other branches of
government have a duty to accept the Court's holdings as the final
word on the meaning of the Constitution." The doctrine of judicial
independence, which emanates from the Article III requirements of
life tenure and prohibition on judicial salary reductions," stipulates
that the Court should decide cases free from majoritarian pressures
and political branch interference.6 This latter doctrine mandates that
the Court determine meaning on the basis of its independent view of
the Constitution.
The consistent adherence by the public and the political branches
to these two doctrines has elevated the Court to the role of primary
and often exclusive decider of constitutional meaning and conveyer of
constitutional values. Dynamic theory's premise that the Court should
prioritize values derived from the Constitution should therefore be
understood in most contexts as an argument that the Court should
prioritize the constitutional values that the Court itself has chosen to
emphasize in its constitutional decisions over time.
Since constitutional values are primarily defined by the Court's
choice of doctrinal emphasis in resolving particular conflicts between
values, they usually evolve as a result of changes to the Court's
majority coalition. It is commonplace that different Courts comprising
different majority coalitions interpret the Constitution in markedly
different ways. Even popular constitutionalists concede that
interpreter of the Constitution. See, for example, Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L J 217,224-25 (1994).
62 Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the
Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in US. History 7 (Princeton 2007). Judicial
supremacy has been a part of constitutional doctrine since the Supreme Court famously declared
in Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that "[it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id at 177. Although there has been
disagreement about whether the statement in Marbury ineluctably led to the doctrine of judicial
supremacy, see, for example, Kramer, 115 Harv L Rev at 89 (cited in note 52), the Court's
elaboration of Marbury in Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958), as "declar[ing] the basic principle
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution," Cooper,
358 US at 18, has been generally understood "as the moment when the Court truly declared itself
the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial
Interpretationof the Constitution,24 Hastings Const L Q 359,369 (1997).
63 US Const Art III, § 1.
As described in the Federalist Papers, judicial independence is "an essential safeguard
6
against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society." Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The
Federalist521,528 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
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"constitutional moments" and the Article V amendment process do
not account for the entire universe of constitutional change. Instead, it
is generally understood that both "transformative appointments" and
the ideological drift of pivotal justices play important roles in
changing the Constitution." In particular, the key to shifts in
constitutional understanding is often the replacement of the median
or "swing" justice' through either the presidential appointment of new
justices or the ideological drift of remaining justices on the Court.
This replacement of the median justice leads to corresponding shifts in
constitutional understandings through both changes in the ideological
orientation of this pivotal justice and in the personal dynamics
between the various justices, which may alter the composition of the
.
.
68
majority coalition on issues.
Sometimes this shift is subtle, as occurred with the replacement
due to ideological drift of the moderate conservative Justice Byron
White as the median justice during the 1983 term with the slightly
more conservative Justice Lewis Powell during the 1984 term." But at
other times, the shift can be quite dramatic, as exemplified in the
presidential appointment that shifted the median justice from the
conservative Justice Tom Clark during the 1961 term to the very
liberal Justice Arthur Goldberg during the 1962 term.o This shift in the
median justice resulted in a dramatically different emphasis on the
protection of civil liberties after 1962 that carried forward until 1969,
when a similarly dramatic shift in the ideological orientation of the
65
See Bruce Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 Harv L Rev 1164, 1166 (1988).
See also Lee Epstein, et al, Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and
How Important?,101 Nw U L Rev 1483,1485-86 (2007).
66 A median justice is one who lies "in the middle of a distribution of Justices, such that (in
an ideological distribution, for example) half the Justices are to the right of (more 'conservative'
than) the median and half are to the left of (more 'liberal' than) the median." Andrew D. Martin,
Kevin M. Quinn, and Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court,
83 NC L Rev 1275, 1277 (2005). See also Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group DecisionMaking,56 J Polit Econ 23,26-28 (1948) (establishing the median voter theorem).
67 See Martin, Quinn, and Epstein, 83 NC L Rev at 1278 (cited in note 66) (explaining that
"the legal policy desired by the median justice will ... be the choice of the Court's majority");
Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 Va L
Rev 1045,1067 (2001) (developing a theory about how the Constitution evolves through changes
in the Court's membership).
68 See Scott R. Meinke and Kevin M. Scott, Collegial Influence and Judicial Voting Change:
The Effect of Membership Change on US. Supreme Court Justices,41 L & Socy Rev 909,914-15
(2007) (describing how changes in the collegial context through the addition of new justices
affect the voting behavior of continuing justices); Charles Cameron, Jee-Kwang Park, and
Deborah Beim, Shaping Supreme Court Policy through Appointments: The Impact of a New
Justice, 93 Minn L Rev 1820, 1856-64 (2009) (finding direct and peer effects on the opinions of
continuing justices after the addition of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to the Court).
69
See Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians,61 Stan L Rev 37,54 (2008).
70
Id.
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median justice occurred, this time back to the right." Unlike the
formal Article V process or the informal process of popular
construction, the transformative appointment of a new justice or the
ideological drift of a pivotal justice can lead to changes in
constitutional meaning or values largely outside the purview of, and
with limited input from, the public.72 This suggests that the
development and evolution of constitutional norms are less the
product of public preferences and more the product of the individual
ideology of justices.
Ultimately, it is the source of Constitution-based values in the
decisions of judicial actors combined with the Court's prioritization of
these values in hard cases that leads to the problem of constitutional
mainstreaming-a problem unaccounted for in dynamic statutory
interpretation theory. In the next Part, I describe and critique
constitutional mainstreaming.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL MAINSTREAMING: A CRITIQUE

A.

Constitutional Mainstreaming in Theory

The idea of constitutional mainstreaming relies on the metaphor
of a judicially constructed constitutional continuum, in which the
constitutional values that the current Court has prioritized lie at the
center of the continuum-in the constitutional mainstream." Values
that the Court has disfavored lie at the ends of the continuum-at the
constitutional fringes. When the Court interprets an ambiguous statute
in an unforeseen context, it often has the choice of at least two
plausible interpretations. One interpretation is more consistent with
the Court's prioritization of constitutional values and thus lies in the
constitutional mainstream. An alternative interpretation lies on the
constitutional fringes and may be in tension with the Court's
prioritized constitutional values. This alternative interpretation,
however, accords more closely with the values reflected in subsequent
71 See Lawrence Baum, Membership Change and Collective Voting Change in the United
States Supreme Court, 54 J Polit 3, 13-21 (1992). This second shift was the result of the
replacement of liberal Justice Thurgood Marshall as the median justice in the 1968 term with
moderate conservative Justice John Marshall Harlan as the median justice in the 1970 term. See
Epstein and Jacobi, 61 Stan L Rev at 54 (cited in note 69).
72 The Senate, which was intended to be the forum through which the public could
influence the selection process, has proven to be particularly inept in ascertaining and judging
the judicial philosophies of nominees. See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 Harv L
Rev 1185,1195 (1988).
73 See Epstein and Jacobi, 61 Stan L Rev at 45 (cited in note 69) ("[A] rather large body of
literature tells us that a single left-right dimension underlies virtually all Supreme Court cases in
virtually all areas of law.").
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statutory enactments-the values Congress has embedded in
substantive federal law. And importantly, it is also constitutionally
valid-that is what distinguishes constitutional mainstreaming from
the avoidance of constitutional invalidation, in which the Court
interprets a statute in a particular way because the alternative
interpretation would be unconstitutional.74
The constitutional mainstream, therefore, often represents only
part of the continuum of what is constitutionally permissible. The
contours of the mainstream can be imagined if we focus on the
Court's constitutional decisions balancing federalism against
individual rights. At issue in many of these cases is the tension
between congressional power to enforce constitutional rights under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prerogatives of the states to
control their own affairs as established in the text and structure of the
Constitution. A particular Court's mainstream along this
constitutional continuum is reflected in the relatively consistent set of
choices that it has made in constitutional cases describing the breadth
and limits of congressional authority to protect individual rights vis-hvis the federalism principle. For example, the second Warren Courtfrom the retirement of Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1962 to the
retirement of Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1969-consistently upheld
congressional enactments under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
against claims that Congress had exceeded its authority and
impermissibly intruded on the prerogatives of the states." In contrast,
the Rehnquist Court-from the retirements of Justices William
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall in 1990 and 1991, respectively, to the
death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist in 2005-dramatically
narrowed the breadth of congressional authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment in favor of preserving state prerogatives.
74 While the constitutionality of the alternative interpretation is often difficult to prove in
practice since it necessarily involves a counterfactual (that is, if the Court had chosen the
interpretation, it would have been nonetheless constitutional), in many cases circumstantial
evidence in the form of related constitutional doctrine or analogous case law would support such
a conclusion. I use the example of Bartlett as an illustration of this in the Introduction.
75
See, for example, Katzenbach v Morgan,384 US 641,646 (1966) (upholding § 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act as a proper exercise of congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment against a challenge that it usurped New York's authority to enforce its election
laws); South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 307-08, 323 (1966) (upholding the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 as a proper exercise of congressional authority under § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment against an argument by several states that it violated their right to implement and
control elections). See also Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc v United States, 379 US 241,261-62 (1964)
(upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibition on racial discrimination in public
accommodations against a challenge that it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
76 See, for example, City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 535-36 (1997) (invalidating the
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified as
amended at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq (1997), because it exceeded Congress's enforcement
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The place of a particular Court's mainstream on the overall
constitutional continuum cannot be ascertained by reading its
decisions in isolation. Instead, one must examine how the Court's
decisions in a particular substantive area relate to that of a previous
Court's and whether the Court has a relatively consistent set of
constitutional holdings that modify, distinguish, or even overrule
precedent of prior Courts. Through these holdings and the reasoning
that underlies them, the Court's shift in emphasis from one
constitutional norm to another is manifested. And ultimately, a new
constitutional mainstream along a different part of the continuum
emerges.
Three questions arise from this idea of a constitutional
mainstream. The first two relate to the dimensions of the
constitutional mainstream: First, given the importance of the
replacement or drift of the median justice to shifts in constitutional
understanding, why is the constitutional mainstream a range on the
constitutional continuum rather than a single point reflecting the
preferences of the median justice? And second, if the constitutional
mainstream does not reflect a single point on the continuum, how
broad is this mainstream? Clearly, the median justice by virtue of her
position has considerable power to influence the content of
constitutional norms. Judicial decision making, however, involves
much more than deference to the preferences of the median justice.7
Although every median justice between 1953 and 2006 has been in the
majority in at least 75 percent of cases during each term," the median
justice never writes all of the opinions in a term. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor authored the highest percentage of opinions by a median
justice, and that was only 44.4 percent during the 2002 term.o While
the median justice is likely to express her preferences in the opinions
she writes, other justices who author opinions will not merely parrot

authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also United States v Morrison,
529 US 598, 625-27 (2000) (invalidating parts of the Violence Against Women Act, Pub L
No 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat 1902 (1994), codified in various sections of Titles 18 and 42, on the
basis of the test established in City of Boerne).
77 A separate constitutional continuum might be posited for different substantive areas, or
where multiple constitutional values are at play.
78 See Cameron, Park, and Beim, 93 Minn L Rev at 1841 (cited in note 68) (describing as
one of the extraordinary predictions of the median voter approach as applied to the Supreme
Court that "majority opinion locations on a natural court do not vary irrespective of which
Justice authored the opinion").
79 See Epstein and Jacobi, 61 Stan L Rev at 55-57 (cited in note 69) (finding that the mean
during this period was 88.6 percent).
8o Id at 69-70. In fact, six median justices between 1953 and 2006 did not write a single
opinion in an important case. Id at 65-66.
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the preferences of the median justice but will instead act strategically."
When writing opinions, the authoring justice will include reasoning for
the decision that reflects the values most consistent with her
preferences that will keep the majority coalition intact. She can
engage in this strategic behavior because she will have information
about the preferences of the other justices-and importantly the
pivotal justice-through the conference following oral argument,
bargaining memos, and internal memos on draft opinions." The
constitutional preferences of the authoring justice, who may be to the
left or right of the median justice, are therefore likely to be prominent
in the opinion." And she will have some degree of slack to shift
reasoning toward her preferences because of the cost to the median
justice of writing concurring opinions and the unwillingness of another
coalition of justices to choose a policy closer to her preferences.'
The constitutional mainstream is the result of this slack and
consists of the range of preferences of justices in the majority coalition
that extend beyond the median justice's ideal point on the
constitutional continuum. At times, such as when the distance between
the median justice and the minority coalition is large, members of the
majority coalition will have a large degree of slack to impose their
preferences in constitutional cases, and the constitutional mainstream
will be broad." At other times, such as when the distance between the
median justice and the minority coalition is small, the members of the
majority coalition have much less slack to impose their preferences in
constitutional cases and the constitutional mainstream will be
narrower. Only in the rarest of cases, such as when the median justice

81 See Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 12-13 (CQ 1998).
82
Id at 65-79.
83 See Cameron, Park, and Beim, 93 Minn L Rev at 1847-53 (cited in note 68) (describing
author-influence theories that predict the preferences of the author of majority opinions will be
reflected in the opinion and that therefore opinion assignments by the chief justice are extremely
important).
84
See id at 1849-53 (describing author-influence models that reflect the costs of writing
and the gravitational influence created by the need to identify a coalition). See also id at 1854-67
(suggesting, on the basis of a case study, that the two author-influence models best describe
judicial decision making). This account very much relies on an agenda-control model of judicial
coalition formation and final voting. Under this model, it is assumed that the median justice "will
support the majority opinion if it is better for them than [the status quo] but will not support the
majority opinion if it is worse for them than [the status quo]." Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W.
Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the US. Supreme
Court 110-11 (Stanford 2005). I believe this model provides a more accurate description of
voting behavior than other models suggesting that justices engage in a constant bidding war until
the majority opinion reflects the preferences of the median justice, because of the combination
of constraints on time and ideology as well as collegial pressures.
85 For a model that supports this account, see Hammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan, Strategic
Behavior at 110-25 (cited in note 84).
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is writing all of the opinions in a particular constitutional area or the
distance between the median justice and justices on either side is
equal, will the constitutional mainstream reflect something so narrow
as the ideal point of the median.
The third question that arises about the constitutional
mainstream is why there is space on the continuum for decisions that
are constitutional but outside the mainstream. It is true that shifts in
the constitutional mainstream are usually accompanied by changes in
the Court's determination of the limits on what is constitutional. For
example, the Rehnquist Court drew narrower limits on Congress's
authority to enact statutes under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
than the Warren Court." However, these changes in constitutional
limits are not usually coextensive with the constitutional mainstream.
One reason that this constitutional space exists outside the
mainstream is the force of precedent in constraining judicial choice.'
While the Court can always overrule its prior decisions and construct
new constitutional limits consistent with its emphasized constitutional
norms, from a legitimacy perspective most of its members recognize
that it is not prudent to do so." In particular, the justices rightly
recognize that the legitimacy of a Court comprising unaccountable
and life-tenured members is very much dependent on the public
perceiving it as an apolitical institution that, in the words of Chief
Justice John Roberts; "call[s] balls and strikes, and [does] not [ ] pitch
or bat."" Overruling the decisions of prior Courts, especially when it
can be directly linked to changes in membership, undermines this
legitimacy." The Court will therefore often have to live uncomfortably
with precedent that a majority of the Court disagrees with even when
it is constructing a constitutional mainstream that diverges from this
precedent.

86 See, for example, Flores, 521 US at 518-19 (interpreting Katzenbach v Morgan in a
manner much more protective of federalism values than originally understood).
87 See, for example, Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent,66 NC L Rev 367, 367-72 (1988);
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149-50 (Yale 1921).
88 See Planned Parenthoodv Casey, 505 US 833,867-68 (1992) (describing the costs to the
legitimacy of the Court when it overrules prior precedent "unnecessarily and under pressure");
Maltz, 66 NC L Rev at 371 (cited in note 87) (explaining that adherence to precedent reinforces
the notion that "principles governing society should be 'rules of law and not merely the opinions
of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high office"'), quoting Florida Department of
Health v FloridaNursing Home Association, 450 US 147, 154 (1981) (Stevens concurring).
89
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts Jr to Be Chief Justice of
the United States, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109 Cong, 1st Sess 56 (2005) (reproducing
a transcript of John Roberts's opening statement for his nomination proceedings).
90 See Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process at 150 (cited in note 87) ("The situation
would [] be intolerable if the weekly changes in the composition of the court were accompanied
by changes in its rulings.").
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For example, the Rehnquist Court after the additions of Justices
Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy had a majority that strongly
valued federalism norms. That majority nonetheless chose not to
directly overturn precedents that diminished state prerogatives;"
instead, the Court turned to statutory interpretation to achieve these
goals indirectly. Thus, a space existed along the continuum in which
particular interpretations of a statute were constitutional under
existing precedents but still were outside the Rehnquist Court's
constitutional mainstream and lay at the constitutional fringes.
Importantly, the constitutional mainstream may have unruly or
blurry edges. Idiosyncratic views of pivotal justices in particular cases
may ultimately contradict the values being emphasized in the
mainstream of the jurisprudence of the majority of the Court. An
example is Justice O'Connor with respect to the colorblindness norm.
Although the later Rehnquist Court certainly placed a greater
emphasis on the constitutional colorblindness norm, Justice O'Connor
ruled on these issues in a manner that made recognition of both the
constitutional mainstream and the Constitution's limits difficult." In
addition, at times a Court's constitutional jurisprudence may be so
disjointed that a mainstream cannot be clearly demarcated. For
example, while it is relatively easy to identify the constitutional
mainstream of the Warren Court and the later Rehnquist Court on the
balance between congressional enforcement authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the federalism principle, it is almost
impossible to identify a similar mainstream in the current Roberts
Court.93
But when the Court does develop a consistent zone of
jurisprudence, it often interprets statutes in the manner that best fits
within the mainstream of its emphasized constitutional values even
91 In Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985), the Court
majority-which emerged after the ideological drift of Justice Harry Blackmun toward a less
federalism-protective coalition-had stated that federalism norms were politically safeguarded
by the representation of states and that Congress therefore had broad commerce clause
authority. Id at 550-52. Rather than overturning this precedent, the new majority coalition that
emerged with the appointments of Justices Scalia and Kennedy established clear statement rules
as a means of protecting the coalition's emphasized federalism norms. See, for example, Gregory
v Ashcroft,501 US 452,470 (1991).
92 See, for example, Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306,328 (2003) (holding that diversity is a
compelling state interest justifying race-conscious admission decisions).
93 The Roberts Court's federalism decisions have thus far been somewhat inconsistent and
have not broken down along typical ideological lines. For good summaries of the Roberts
Court's federalism decisions, see John Dinan and Shama Gamkhar, The State of American
Federalism2008-2009: The PresidentialElection, the Economic Downturn, and the Consequences
for Federalism, 39 Publius 369, 394-98 (2009); John Dinan, The State of American Federalism
2007-2008: Resurgent State Influence in the National Policy Process and Continued State Policy
Innovation,38 Publius 381,401-10 (2008).
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though it may run contrary to evolving statute-based values-that is,
values reflected in subsequently enacted statutes. I call this
interpretive practice "constitutional mainstreaming."
The Court uses several tools to engage in the constitutional
mainstreaming of statutes. The most obvious and familiar tool is the
modern constitutional avoidance canon. According to this canon,
"where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress."94 In contrast to the classic constitutional
avoidance canon in which the Court chooses an interpretation of the
statute consistent with the Constitution to avoid invalidation of the
statute, the modern avoidance canon "allow[s] serious but potentially
unavailing constitutional objections to dictate statutory meaning."" At
times, the Court abuses this canon, applying it when the constitutional
concern is implausible." In these contexts, the Court raises the concern
about "serious constitutional problem[s]" to situate the statute within
the constitutional mainstream and to keep it away from the
constitutional fringes."
Less obvious tools of constitutional mainstreaming include the
various clear statement rules that protect underenforced
constitutional norms such as federalism." The use of these canons
often permits the Court to make value choices in interpreting statutes
that can result in its bending statutes into its constitutional

94 Edward J DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades
Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988). See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions,85 Georgetown L
J 1945,1949 (1997).
95 Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAvoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum L
Rev 1189,1203 (2006). Proponents of the modern avoidance canon have suggested that it serves
as an important and legitimate means by which the Court enforces the fundamental values
underlying the Constitution. See, for example, Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory
Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal L Rev 397, 402 (2005); Ernest A. Young,
ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex L
Rev 1549, 1552 (2000). Opponents have suggested that the canon is primarily used by the Court
to enforce its preferred views of the Constitution through its interpretation of ambiguous (and
sometimes, unambiguous) statutes. See, for example, Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding
Constitutional Questions Promote Judicial Independence?, 56 Case W Res L Rev 1031, 1038
(2006) (suggesting that the Court often uses the canon to enforce its views of the Constitution);
William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L
Rev 831, 861 (2001) (suggesting that the sub silentio constitutional lawmaking through the
modern avoidance canon is problematic).
96 See Morrison, 106 Colum L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 95).
97 See, for example, Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678,682 (2001).
98 See Gregory, 501 US at 464.
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mainstream." Finally, as is often the case in the dynamic interpretation
of statutes, constitutional mainstreaming sometimes occurs beneath
the legitimating veil of archaeological methodologies-that is,
methods that involve searches for the original legislative intent or
purpose." Although the Court says that it is relying on seemingly
indeterminate evidence of intent or purpose to provide determinate
answers as to what the statute means, it often in fact is deriving this
meaning from the Constitution-based values that it has emphasized in
its constitutional jurisprudence.
These tools of constitutional mainstreaming can be distinguished
from the tools used to avoid constitutional invalidation. For example,
when the Court relies on the traditional constitutional avoidance
canon to bypass an alternative interpretation of the statute that
accords with evolving statute-based values but would be
unconstitutional, it has made a legitimately restrained choice to avoid
the constitutional invalidation of a statute.o' However, when the Court
bypasses an alternative interpretation of the statute that accords with
evolving statute-based values and would be constitutional, its
approach raises important democratic legitimacy concerns. This sort of
problematic constitutional mainstreaming is represented in the
modern constitutional avoidance canon, the clear statement rules, and
the Court's manipulation of intent and purpose.
B.

The Inconsistency of Constitutional Mainstreaming with the
Dynamic Conception of Legislative Supremacy

In this Section, I argue that the Court's practice of constitutional
mainstreaming is unlikely to accord with legislative preferences or
with underlying democratic preferences. As background, I first explain
dynamic theory's conception of legislative supremacy. Then I address,
but ultimately reject, several arguments suggesting that the Court
might in fact actively reflect the legislative will or the democratic will
in its decisions. The first argument points to the possibility of
legislative overrides as a means by which the Court is forced to
constrain itself to legislative desires; the second argument suggests
that the Court is highly sensitive to popular opinion and will not stray
far from democratic preferences for fear of backlash. While both are
facially appealing theories, I demonstrate that neither matches up well
99 This is the classic constitutional avoidance canon. See Vermeule, 85 Georgetown L J
at 1949 (cited in note 94); William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-constitutionalLaw:
Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593,598-99 (1992).
100 See William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning,42 Stan L Rev 321, 363-4 (1990).
lot See Vermeule,85 Georgetown L J at 1949 (cited in note 94).
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to the reality of judicial decision making. The upshot is that the
Court's constitutional mainstreaming is most likely to reflect the
preferences of the justices, not those of the legislature or the people
themselves.
The traditional doctrine of legislative supremacy establishes a
role for courts that is subordinate to legislative will in the statutoryinterpretive process." Scholars have derived this doctrine from two
sources. First, these scholars argue that it is mandated by Article I of
the Constitution, which vests all legislative powers in the Congress.103
This constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean that the
enacting legislature is superior to the courts and its judgments as to
the statute's meaning and that its determinations should guide the
courts' judgment on a statute's scope and proper application.'" The
other source of the traditional doctrine of legislative supremacy is
democratic theory and the premise that the legislature, through its
enactments, is the best representative of democratic will. This will,
according to most accounts, should also be reflected in the courts'
interpretation of statutes.s
Dynamic theorists argue that this traditional doctrine of
legislative supremacy is inadequate because it fails to account for the
hard cases in which ambiguous statutes must be interpreted in
contexts not foreseen by the enacting legislature.' How can courts act
in a manner consistent with the traditional doctrine of legislative
supremacy when the text and legislative history provide no specific
answers about how the statute should be applied in those particular
contexts? Because of this difficulty, dynamic theorists endorse a
conception of legislative supremacy that contends courts should serve
as a subordinate partner to the current legislature in the interpretation
of ambiguous statutes.o In this partnership, courts "should be attuned
102 See Correia, 42 Case W Res L Rev at 1130 (cited in note 37); Eskridge, 78 Georgetown
L J at 326-27 (cited in note 21). Consider Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and
Legislative Supremacy,78 Georgetown L J 281,317-18 (1989).
103 US Const Art I, § 1.
104 See, for example, Correia, 42 Case W Res L Rev at 1129,1132 (cited in note 37); Earl M.
Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist
Approach, 63 Tulane L Rev 1, 9 (1988). In addition to these formal Article I accounts of the
source of legislative supremacy, John Manning argues that the faithful-agent theory of legislative
supremacy follows from the constitutional separation of powers and the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Article I, § 7 of the Constitution, which he argues are inconsistent
with broad judicial lawmaking and discretion in the interpretation of statutes. John E Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum L Rev 1, 57-78 (2001).
105 See Martin H. Redish and Theodore T.Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalismin Statutory Interpretation,68Tulane L Rev 803,811 (1994).
106 See Eskridge, 78 Georgetown L J at 323-24 (cited in note 21).
107 See id at 343. Eskridge suggests that this cooperative partnership model follows from
the general and uncontroversial practice of judges equitably construing statutes to address the
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to the legislature's current policies, its reliance on prior statutes and
judicial interpretation of those statutes, and its shifts in policy
direction."'
Taking this dynamic conception of legislative supremacy literally,
the argument that it is inconsistent with constitutional mainstreaming
seems easy. When the Court engages in constitutional mainstreaming,
it does not act as a subordinate partner to the current legislature.
Instead, the Court devalues the best evidence of the preferences of
the current legislature (namely, subsequent legislative enactments) in
favor of the norms underlying its own constitutional decisions.
However, if dynamic theorists wished to justify constitutional
mainstreaming, they would likely point out that judicial
interpretations of statutes contrary to democratic preferences are
subject to override through "the ordinary processes of electorally
accountable policymaking."'09 Since Congress has the last word on the
meaning of a statute, this should eliminate, or at the very least
ameliorate, concern about the judiciary using its discretion to impose
its own policy preferences.no
The problem with this argument is that such overrides are
exceedingly rare, making it risky to rely on them as a means of
ensuring consistency between the Court's statutory interpretations
and legislative preferences. In fact, one scholar has famously argued
that statutory overrides are so rare that the Court's interpretation of
statutes is "hardly less 'final' than the Court's decisions interpreting
the Constitution.""' This account has been supported by empirical

unprovided-for cases during the Founding era. This approach, he argues, was not challenged
during the Constitutional Convention and was supported during the state ratifying debates. See
generally William N. Eskridge Jr, All about Words: Early Understandingsof the "JudicialPower"
in Statutory Interpretation,1776-1806, 101 Colum L Rev 990 (2001).
10 Eskridge, 78 Georgetown L J at 343 (cited in note 21). Dynamic statutory interpretation
suggests another reason for looking to the values of the current legislature. From the perspective
of majoritarianism, dynamic theorists argue that the current legislature and not the enacting
legislature will reflect current majoritarian preferences when the circumstances have changed
from that which existed at the time of the original enactment because "there is usually good
reason to believe that the historical majority has vanished." Eskridge, 135 U Pa L Rev at 1527
(cited in note 14).
109 See, for example, Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An
Inquiry into the Legitimacy of ConstitutionalPolicymaking by the Judiciary28 n * (Yale 1982).
110 The possibility of overrides is also a reason that scholars have paid relatively little
attention to the concerns of countermajoritarianism in the context of statutory interpretation.
See Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Stare Decisis,
88 Mich L Rev 177,204 (1989).
111 Glendon A. Schubert, ConstitutionalPolitics: The Political Behavior of Supreme Court
Justicesand the ConstitutionalPoliciesThat They Make 258 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1960).
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evidence showing that the great majority of the Court's statutory
interpretations are left undisturbed by Congress.12
Dynamic theorists, however, argue that despite the infrequency of
overrides, their possibility nonetheless ensures the consistency of the
Court's dynamic interpretation of statutes with the dynamic
conception of legislative supremacy. Specifically, relying on positive
political theory, dynamic theorists contend that the infrequency of
overrides is due to the fact that when the Court interprets a statute, it
accurately anticipates the preferences of the political branches. By
doing so, it avoids overrides."' If we transfer this argument to the
context of constitutional mainstreaming, it would suggest that even
though the Court is favoring its own emphasized constitutional norms
over the values reflected in subsequent statutes in its interpretation of
statutes, it may nonetheless be accurately reflecting the current
legislature's preferences. Specifically, when the Court engages in
constitutional mainstreaming, it may be anticipating the congressional
response and choosing only interpretations that will not be
overridden. These interpretations of statutes would therefore accord
with the preferences of the current legislature and the dynamic
conception of legislative supremacy.
While the argument is attractive, the positive political theory
explanation of the infrequency of legislative overrides is undermined
by two problems. First, the theory lacks empirical support. Second, the
theory is incompatible with the actual institutional separation of the
Court and Congress. This institutional separation makes it extremely
difficult for the Court to be able to accurately anticipate the
preferences of specific political actors as predicted by the theory.
To see the empirical weaknesses underlying the positive political
theory predictions of judicial behavior, it is necessary to first provide a
112 See Nancy C. Staudt, Ren6 Lindstddt, and Jason O'Connor, Judicial Decisions as
Legislation: Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954-2005, 82 NYU L
Rev 1340, 1353-54 (2007) (finding that only 8 percent of the tax cases heard by the Supreme
Court were overridden by Congress); Virginia A. Hettinger and Christopher Zorn, Explaining
the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 Legis Stud
Q 5, 10 (2005) (finding an override rate of only 6.9 percent among civil rights and civil liberties
cases decided from 1967 to 1989); Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, The Next Word:
CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 Temple L Rev 425, 445 (1992)
(finding that Congress overrode Supreme Court decisions most often in the immediate wake of
those decisions but that it only did so successfully ranging from 5.4 percent in federalism cases to
26.8 percent in economic regulation cases); Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpretation of the
Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11 Am Polit Rsrch 441, 445 (1983) (finding that only
12 percent of labor and antitrust cases were overridden by Congress from 1950 to 1970). But see
Jeb Barnes, Overruled? Legislative Overrides, Pluralism, and Contemporary Court-Congress
Relations 43 (Stanford 2004).
113 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 Cal L Rev 613,643-64 (1991) (describing the anticipatory-response game).
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simplified account of the model. The argument that the Court is
constrained by the possibility of legislative override relies on a gametheoretic model in which the Court calibrates its interpretation of
statutes in anticipation of how Congress will respond. The most basic
formulation of the model situates the Court, Congress, and the
President in a one-dimensional linear space in which the preferences
of the relevant actors are "charted along a left-right, or liberalconservative, spectrum." 4 In addition to the majority of the Supreme
Court, the relevant actors include congressional gatekeepers that
control the congressional agenda: congressional committees with
jurisdiction over the statute, the committee chair, and the party
leadership. These gatekeepers decide whether to introduce override
legislation and can also use procedural devices to impede or delay a
proposed override with which they disagree."' The two other relevant
actors are the median member of Congress, whose vote is necessary to
overrule the Court, and the President, who can veto legislation."'
In the typical formulation of the sequential game, the Court
makes the first move when it interprets the statute. Congress then
must decide whether to seek an override. If the override is successful,
then the President assesses whether to veto the congressional override
and, if he does, Congress must determine whether to override the veto.
According to the model, the Court will choose an interpretation
that is as close to its preference as possible but will be constrained in
its choice by its desire to avoid an override."' In contexts in which the
Court's ideal preference point is one that the congressional
gatekeeper prefers to that of the preference point of the median
member of Congress, the Court will impose its own preference on the
interpretation of the statute since it can be assured that the
gatekeeper will not allow passage of override legislation. In other
contexts in which the Court's ideal preference point is out of line with
at least one of the gatekeepers, it will choose the interpretation that is
closest to its preference that is also consistent with the preferences of

114 Id at 643-44 (describing the basic model). For variations of the anticipated-response
game model, see John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 263, 265 (1992); John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan,
CongressionalInfluence on Bureaucracy,6 J L, Econ, & Org 1,5-6 (1990).
115 A congressional committee can "kill" legislation by "rewrit[ing] the bill entirely,
reject[ing] it, or simply refus[ing] to consider it." Oleszek, Congressional Proceduresat 89 (cited
in note 12).
116 More complicated versions of the game-theoretic model account for bicameralism and
the possibility of senatorial holds and filibusters. See Ferejohn and Weingast, 12 Intl Rev L &
Econ at 267 (cited in note 114). An elaboration of these more complex models is not necessary
for purposes of this discussion.
117 See id at 271,276-78.
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at least one of the gatekeepers that can prevent an override. This
model contains two strong assumptions. First, it assumes that the
Court has perfect information about the optimal preferences of each
of the other actors and can therefore anticipate their responses to its
interpretation of statutes."' Second, it assumes that the Court prefers
not to be overridden.11
The positive political theory models, for which this simplified
account is but one example, are elegant, but their explanatory force
has proven to be quite limited. Tests of the models have found little
empirical support for the anticipated-response game.'20 In perhaps the
most well known of these tests undermining the theory, Jeffrey Segal
and Harold Spaeth examined the ideological values of individual
justices and assessed whether their votes deviate from their
predisposition as the political environment changed.12 ' Contrary to
early studies that had found that the Court acted strategically and
interpreted statutes to avoid an override, Segal used controls that
more accurately accounted for the attitudinal predisposition of
members of the Court. Specifically, rather than looking to party
identification of the nominating President as evidence of attitudinal
disposition, a measure that unrealistically clumps, for example,
Republican nominees Justices Brennan and Scalia into the same
category,12 Segal looked to the ideological value scores of individual

118 Eskridge,79 Cal L Rev at 644 (cited in note 113).
119 Id.

120 See, for example, Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model Revisited 345-48 (Cambridge 2002); Jeffrey Segal, Chad Westerland, and
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress,the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional
Separation of Powers Model *23 (unpublished manuscript, Nov 2007), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=998164 (visited May 9, 2011); James F. Spriggs II and Thomas G.
Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of US. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J Polit 1091, 1107
(2001); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-PowersGames in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts,91 Am Polit Sci Rev 28,33-34 (1997). See also Jeffrey A. Segal and Chad Westerland, The
Supreme Court, Congress,and JudicialReview, 83 NC L Rev 1323, 1334 (2005) (citing additional
scholarship finding no support for the separation of powers model). But see Mario Bergara,
Barak Richman, and Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The
Congressional Constraint,28 Legis Stud 0 247, 262-63 (2003); Barry Friedman and Anna L.
Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 Ind L J 123, 139 (2003); Pablo T Spiller and Rafael Gely,
CongressionalControl or JudicialIndependence: The Determinantsof US. Supreme CourtLaborRelations Decisions,1949-1988,23 RAND J Econ 463,484 (1992).
121 See Segal and Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited at 399-403,424-28 (cited in note 120).
122 See Segal, 91 Am Polit Sci Rev at 34-35 (cited in note 120) (noting that "there are
obvious problems in assuming that both Democrats (e.g. Brennan and Jackson) and Republicans
(e.g. Warren and Scalia) on the Court are homogenous" for the purposes of this model). For an
example of categorization according to the nominating President's party identification, see
Spiller and Gely, 23 Rand J Econ at 491 (cited in note 120).
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justices.123 He found that there was "serious doubt on whether the
justices vote other than sincerely with regard to congressional
preferences, except on the rarest occasions."24 Justices' votes on
statutory interpretation issues were influenced by their attitudinal
dispositions and were seemingly unconstrained by congressional
gatekeeper preferences."'
But even if the empirical evidence indicated the opposite-that
the Court does seek to avoid legislative override-this would not
resolve the deeper conflict between constitutional mainstreaming and
legislative supremacy. Congressional gatekeepers are often actors that
do not reflect the median preferences of Congress or the broader
democratic preferences of the polity. Because of the increased
polarization of the two chambers of Congress, the existence of
congressional gatekeepers does little to constrain judicial discretion to
interpret statutes contrary to democratic preferences. For example,
Segal's examination of the political preference of House and Senate
Judiciary Committee chairs showed that they were often "located at
complete opposite ends of the political spectrum."26 The Court could
often avoid an override simply by not interpreting a statute in an
extreme way. So long as the Court's interpretation lies between the
preferences of these two gatekeepers, neither could successfully
introduce an override to pull the statute closer to their own preferred
policies, since their counterpart in the other chamber would block
such a move. This leaves the Court with great leeway in its
interpretation of ambiguous statutes.12 The possibility of override in
most contexts, therefore, often does little to ensure that the Court's
decision making is consistent with the dynamic conception of
legislative supremacy.
Ultimately, the findings in the empirical studies contradicting
positive political theory seem rather intuitive once one accounts for
institutional separation of the Court from the two political branches.
123 These scores were derived from a content analysis of major newspaper editorials about
the justices from point of nomination to confirmation. See Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover,
The Ideological Values and the Votes of US. Supreme Court Justices, 83 Am Polit Sci Rev 557,
559-60 (1989).
124 Segal, 91 Am Polit Sci Rev at 42 (cited in note 120). Later studies found similar results.
See, for example, Hettinger and Zorn, 30 Legis Stud Q at 21 (cited in note 112); Segal and
Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited at 348 (cited in note 120); Spriggs and Hansford, 63 J Polit
at 1107 (cited in note 120). But see Bergara, Richman, and Spiller, 28 Legis Stud 0 at 267 (cited
in note 120).
125 Segal, 91 Am Polit Sci Rev at 37-38 (cited in note 120).
126 Id at 39.
127 See id at 38-39 (finding that the Court has an "extraordinary" range of positions
available to it on the political spectrum and concluding that many justices "cannot be
constrained by Congress").
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The constitutional design of the Court as an institution insulated from
the elected branches of government results in justices who usually
(and quite expectedly) lack enough information about the preferences
of specific congressional actors to anticipate the possibility of
override. Although justices may be familiar with the basic political
composition of the congressional committee with jurisdiction over the
particular statute being interpreted, it is difficult to conceive of most
justices as having knowledge about the specific political dynamics of
these committees. Motivated by rules of judicial ethics, justices do not
sit in on congressional committee meetings and rarely have private
meetings with members of Congress.'28 In addition, their clerks do not
interact with legislative staffs.'29 Thus, even assuming that the Court
does not want its decisions overridden, there is no reason to think that
justices should be particularly good at anticipating the preferences of
congressional gatekeepers.
Dynamic theorists likely recognize that the perfect-information
assumption of the anticipated-response game model is too strong. But
even the assumption that justices have merely adequate information
of congressional gatekeepers' preferences still seems too strong. It is
difficult to see how the Court could, with such limited information,
accurately anticipate the response of Congress to its interpretation of
statutes."o

The empirical evidence and the institutional separation of the
Court from Congress suggest that, contrary to the predictions of
positive political theory's anticipated-response game, constitutional
mainstreaming is in considerable tension with the dynamic conception
of legislative supremacy. In particular, if members of the Court either
cannot or choose not to anticipate the preferences of congressional
actors who could prevent overrides, then the possibility of a rare
128 See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canons 1-2 (2009) (providing that judges
should "uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary" and "avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities"). See also Mike McIntire, The Justice and the
Magnate,NY Times Al (June 19,2011) ("Although the Supreme Court is not bound by the code,
justices have said they adhere to it.").
129 See Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees, Canons 1-2 (2009) (providing the same
ethical guidelines as for judges). See also Rule 2.12(A): Supervisory Duties, ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 2 (2009) (requiring court staff to act in manner consistent with Code).
130The conventional account of the reason for the infrequency of legislative overrides is
therefore more likely to be accurate. Under that account, legislative overrides are rare because
Congress may not be aware of the Supreme Court interpretation of a statute. See, for example,
Marshall, 88 Mich L Rev at 186 (cited in note 110). Even when it is aware, congressional inaction
may reflect the difficulty of getting override legislation-even legislation consistent with the
preferences of the majority of the legislators and the President-through a busy legislative
process that is oriented toward maintaining the status quo. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution 170-72 (Harvard 1993) (observing that endowment effects create legislative status
quo bias).
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override acts as a futile constraint on judicial discretion. And, as a
result, the door is open for the Court to engage in the constitutional
mainstreaming of statutes without accounting for the preferences of
the current Congress.
Dynamic theory also urges that the Court should interpret
statutes consistent with current congressional preferences because it is
thought that this will lead to interpretations reflecting evolving
democratic preferences. The current Congress is therefore just a proxy
for the broader public will. According to this account, even if the
Court is not able to anticipate current congressional preferences, as
long as the Court's constitutional mainstreaming of statutes reflects
broader democratic preferences, it is acting consistently with the
dynamic conception of legislative supremacy. Contrary to this account,
I argue that there are also strong reasons to believe that the Court
does not reflect broader popular preferences in its practice of
constitutional mainstreaming. As a result, constitutional mainstreaming
conflicts with the deeper democratic norms underlying the dynamic
conception of legislative supremacy.
Legal scholars and political scientists over the past fifty years
have argued that the Court is an institution that is responsive to
democratic preferences.' In particular, they have suggested that Mr.
Dooley's famous dictum that "th' Supreme Court follows th' illiction
returns"'32 aptly describes the behavior of the Court."' According to
this view, the Court is responsive to democratic preferences in its
constitutional decisions over time. Extending this argument to the
statutory-interpretive context, it would suggest that when the Court
engages in the constitutional mainstreaming of statutes, it decides
difficult interpretive matters in a manner consistent with evolving
majority desires.
The broad acceptance of Mr. Dooley's dictum among academics
can at least partially be attributed to its counterintuitiveness. The idea
that the Court's decisions track popular preferences is inconsistent
with the desires of the Framers of the Constitution to ensure the
131 See, for example, Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has
Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 383 (Farrar, Straus
and Giroux 2009); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 21 (Chicago 2d ed 2008); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,6 J Pub L 279,293 (1957). But see Richard H. Pildes,
Is the Supreme Court a 'Majoritarian'Institution?,2010 S Ct Rev 103,105-06.
132 See Peter F. Dunne, Mr. Dooley's Opinions 26 (R.H. Russell 1901).
133 See, for example, Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw U L Rev 269,272
(1993); William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions,87 Am Polit Sci Rev 87,
98 (1993).
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independence of the federal courts from legislative and majoritarian
encroachments.14 Article II of the Constitution establishes a judicial
selection method that lacks a mechanism for direct electoral
accountability since it requires that the President nominate and the
Senate confirm justices to the Supreme Court."' The nomination
process in practice is idiosyncratic, with the President usually making
the decision out of public view." And the confirmation process, which
could in theory serve as the public's venue for assessing the
consistency of the justice's values with its own, does little to reveal the
judicial ideologies of appointees. This makes it impossible for the
senators to ensure that the nominees will decide cases in a manner
consistent with current majoritarian values.' Finally, any possibility
for later direct public input into the decision of judicial actors has
been eliminated by the Article III grant of life tenure to justices
during good behavior."' Nonetheless, in spite of these institutional
features of the judiciary, scholars have argued that the responsiveness
of the Court to democratic preferences is accurate as an empirical
matter.
Robert Dahl was one of the first scholars to advance this claim in
the 1950s. He argued that the periodic appointment and confirmation
of justices by an electorally accountable President and Senate ensures
that the views of the Court "are never for long out of line with the
policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities."'39 Dahl, in his
study, did not fully account for two important aspects of the
appointment process that result in a much less responsive Court. The
first is that there is likely to be a much more considerable time lag
than even Dahl anticipated in the responsiveness of the Court to
lawmaking majorities.'40 At the time that Dahl wrote his seminal piece
in 1957, justices were on average appointed every twenty-two
See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521,527-29 (cited in note 64).
135 US Const Art II, § 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court.").
136 See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of
Article III Judges, 95 Georgetown L J 965,978 (2007).
137 Commentators are nearly unanimous in the view that the confirmation process is
ineffective in bringing the philosophy or values of judicial appointees into public view. See, for
example, Ackerman, 101 Harv L Rev at 1168 (cited in note 65); Carter, 101 Harv L Rev at 1195
(cited in note 72) ("[T]he Senate may lack the institutional capacity to evaluate judicial
philosophy in any non trivial theoretical sense."); Elena Kagan, Book Review, Confirmation
Messes, Old and New, 62 U Chi L Rev 919,941-42 (1995).
138 US Const Art III, § 1.
139 Dahl, 6 J Pub L at 285 (cited in note 131).
140 Dahl does concede that there will be "short-lived transitional periods when the old
alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take control of political institutions" in
which the Supreme Court could lie outside of the dominant alliance. Id at 293.
134
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months.4 Over time, the rate of turnover has decreased to an average
of one new justice for each presidential term in office.142 Thus even a
two-term President would be unlikely to appoint more than two
justices, in contrast to the four that Dahl anticipated.
The opportunity for the Court to "catch up" to the views of the
lawmaking majority is complicated by a second limit to the political
appointment process as a means of securing responsiveness: strategic
retirements. Justices engage in strategic retirements when they "time[]
their retirements based on which president would nominate their
successors." 43 Strategic retirements limit the opportunity for new
lawmaking majorities to secure a Supreme Court that reflects their
values.
Thus, even if we assume that the judicial appointment process
should eventually align the Supreme Court's views with those of the
lawmaking majority, such congruence is likely to occur only with a
substantial lag. And in many circumstances, given the two-term limit
on the presidency, the judiciary may not ever catch up to the values of
the current lawmaking majority." The lag in responsiveness that Dahl
envisions can therefore evolve into a permanent disjuncture between
the values reflected in the Court's decisions and those reflected in the
decisions of the elected branches.
141 Id at 284. Dahl calculated that each President therefore could "expect to appoint about
two new justices during one term of office; and if this were not enough to tip the balance on a
normally divided Court, he [was] almost certain to succeed in two terms." Id. Even assuming the
turnover calculated by Dahl, there will be a lag between the change in the party administration
of the President and Senate and the time it takes to appoint a sufficient number of justices to
accord with the ideological orientation of the elected branches. Nearly two decades after Dahl's
study, Richard Funston demonstrated empirically that this lag period is approximately five years,
during which the Court will be out of line with the lawmaking majority after electoral or partisan
realignments. See Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,69 Am Polit Sci
Rev 795,806-07 (1975).
142 The average tenure of justices has risen from 12.2 years in the period from 1941 through
1970 to 26.1 years in the period from 1971 to 2000. See Pildes, 2010 S Ct Rev at 140 (cited in
note 131); Steven G. Calabresi and James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 Harv J L & Pub Pol 769,771 (2006).
143 James E. DiTullio and John B. Schochet, Saving This Honorable Court: A Proposal to
Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered,Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms,
90 Va L Rev 1093,1101 (2004). While the extent of strategic retirements is empirically debatable,
they may increasingly be part of the justices' calculations as members of the Court. Based on an
empirical analysis, Keith Krehbiel finds that support for the strategic retirement hypothesis is
weak. See Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game, 51 Am J
Polit Sci 231, 238 (2006). The study does not, however, account for unsuccessful attempts by
justices to remain on the bench until a President of their party can appoint their successors. Also,
the study fails to account for the desire of Republican nominees such as Harry Blackmun to be
replaced by a Democratic appointment. See DiTullio and Schochet, 90 Va L Rev at 1103-04
(cited in note 143).
144 When the same party controls the executive for three consecutive terms, the
replacement hypothesis may hold. However, this has occurred only once since 1952.
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Political scientists and legal scholars have recently looked beyond
the replacement hypothesis and have argued that the Court is directly
The reason for this direct
responsive to public opinion.'
responsiveness to public opinion is the Court's recognition that its
authority as a political institution "depends on public deference and
respect.""' Justices "[c]oncerned with maintaining their political
power... [are] careful not to jeopardize their collective authority or
legitimacy by deviating too far or too long from strongly held public
views on fundamental issues."47 These scholars advance a "political
adjustment hypothesis" that justices "modify their decisions-if not
their personal beliefs-on some issues in response to what they
individually perceive as long term and fundamental changes in public
opinion" in order to maintain the power of the Court and secure
implementation of its decisions.14 The Court, according to the politicaladjustment hypothesis, therefore decides cases by feeling out the
public mood and assessing whether its decisions accord with the
identifiable preferences, or at least the strongly identifiable
preferences, of the public.'
While the hypothesis has a following among legal scholars,"s there
is only weak empirical support for it. Studies most sympathetic to the
political-adjustment hypothesis suggest that there is a statistically
significant but very modest correlation between public opinion and
the decisions of certain moderate judges and that the effect of public
opinion on judicial decisions occurs at a lag ranging from one to seven
years."' These studies suggest, consistent with Dahl's replacement

145 See William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model,
and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-analytic Perspective, 58 J Polit 169, 194 (1996);
Mishler and Sheehan, 87 Am Polit Sci Rev at 96 (cited in note 133).
146 Mishler and Sheehan, 58 J Polit at 173 (cited in note 145).
147 Id at 174.
148 Id. See also Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch
Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences,66 J Polit 1018,
1019 (2004). William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan also advance a "political conversion"
hypothesis in which public opinion "may stimulate a change in that justice's thinking thereby
influencing the justice's behavior." Mishler and Sheehan, 58 J Polit at 175 (cited in note 145).This
line of argument is similar to the one put forward by legal scholars responding to the
countermajoritarian difficulty. See Friedman, The Will of the People at 370-71 (cited in note 131).
149 See Mishler and Sheehan, 58 J Polit at 174 (cited in note 145).
150See, for example, Friedman, The Will of the People at 374-76 (cited in note 131). But see
Pildes, 2010 S Ct Rev at 158 (cited in note 131).
151 See Mishler and Sheehan, 87 Am Polit Sci Rev at 96 (cited in note 133); Mishler and
Sheehan, 58 J Polit at 194 (cited in note 145); Michael W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the
Supreme Court: Cross-Time Analyses of CriminalProcedure and Civil Rights Cases, 48 Polit Res
Q 61, 72-73 (1996); Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson, The Macro
Polity 313 (Cambridge 2001). But see Helmut Norpoth and Jeffrey A. Segal, PopularInfluence
on Supreme Court Decisions,88 Am Polit Sci Rev 711,713-14 (1994).
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hypothesis, that most, if not all, of the effect of public opinion on the
Court's decision instead occurs through the appointment process.15
Other studies indicate that the combined effect of public opinion
through the appointment process and political adjustments by justices
is substantially less and occurs at a greater lag than the effect of public
opinion on the decisions of elected actors.' These empirical results
reflect the relative strength of electoral constraints on elected officials
as compared to any perceived need for justices to maintain the
institutional legitimacy of the Court by complying with public opinion.
In sum, Dahl's argument that the Court is "never for long out of
line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities"
is weakened but not necessarily disproven by the empirical studies.'
Still, even if his claim is true over a longer time horizon, the Court will
still regularly have views and hold values that are inconsistent with
those of the current Congress, the President, and the public. A
disjuncture is therefore likely to recur between the values emphasized
in the mainstream of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence and the
values of the other elected branches. It is in this context of value
disjuncture that constitutional mainstreaming comes into conflict with
the substantive democratic principles underlying the dynamic
conception of legislative supremacy.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE PRIORITIZATION OF
STATUTE-BASED VALUES

In the previous Part, I argued that the Court's constitutional
mainstreaming of ambiguous statutes is inconsistent with a formal
understanding of the dynamic conception of legislative supremacy
because the Court is not well positioned to anticipate the preferences
of the current Congress. In addition, I argued that constitutional
mainstreaming is inconsistent with a more substantive understanding
of the dynamic conception of legislative supremacy because there is
usually a substantial lag in the responsiveness of the Court to public
preferences.
In this Part, I argue that when the Court confronts ambiguous
statutes, it should instead look to values derived from subsequently
enacted statutes.'5 Evolving values derived from subsequently enacted
152 See, for example, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, The Macro Polity at 313-14 (cited in
note 151).
153 Id. See also McGuire and Stimson, 66 J Polit at 1022 (cited in note 148); Mishler and
Sheehan, 58 J Polit at 187-95 (cited in note 145).
154 Dahl, 6 J Pub L at 285 (cited in note 131).
155 As I discuss below, in looking to the values underlying subsequently enacted statutes, the
Court should prioritize more recently enacted statutes over older statutes. See Part III.B.
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statutes will better reflect evolving democratic preferences than
judicially emphasized constitutional norms. I then offer a preliminary
framework for a modified dynamic approach to the interpretation of
ambiguous statutes in unforeseen contexts.
A.

Statute-Based Values and Evolving Democratic Preferences

Dynamic theorists identify subsequently enacted statutes as the
most important source of statute-based values. At first blush, it seems
obvious that statutory enactments by Congress will tend to be more
responsive to democratic preferences than judicially emphasized
constitutional values. The legislature is a representative institution
that, unlike the judiciary, is designed to be accountable to the public
through periodic elections. According to the standard US
constitutional theory of representative government, members of the
legislature, motivated to "act[] in the interest of the represented,""'
should enact statutes that are at the very least driven by the
legislator's perception of what the public needs or wants."' Of course,
this theory implicitly assumes that special interest groups have been
successfully constrained and a certain degree of political equality
exists among the members of the public"'- assumptions that are
ultimately unrealistic. As an alternative model of legislative behavior,
pluralism suggests that, although special interest groups are not
constrained and legislation results directly from interest group
lobbying, those legislative outcomes do reflect the balance of power in
society."9 Under either model, statutes should roughly mirror
democratic preferences.
Dynamic theorists are skeptical of both of these accounts of the
political process, and this skepticism underlies their preference for
public values derived from the Constitution rather than from statutes.
They view the legislative process, and its outcomes, through the lens of

Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 209 (California 1972).
See, for example, R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of CongressionalAction 37 (Yale 1990);
John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions 31 (Michigan 3d ed 1989); David R. Mayhew,
Congress: The Electoral Connection 37-38 (Yale 1974); Richard F. Fenno Jr, Congressmen in
Committees 1 (Little, Brown 1973);Aage R. Clausen, How Congressmen Decide:A Policy Focus 2
(St Martin's 1973).
158 See Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist56,62 (cited in note 64).
159 For an elaboration of the pluralist model, see Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 Tex L Rev 873, 875 (1987); Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?
271-73 (Yale 1961); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 124-51 (Chicago 1956);
Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics:A Study in Basing-PointLegislation 7 (Cornell 1952);
David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion 56-62
(Knopf 1951). See also Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and
American Democracy 7-8 (Harper & Row 1986).
156
157
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public choice theory.160 Public choice theory emphasizes collective
action problems, which give small and unrepresentative special
interest groups an advantage over more diffuse interests in organizing
to influence the legislature politically.'61 Since these politically
organized special interest groups coexist with a mostly unorganized
public, they are usually able to secure favorable legislation at the
expense of the broader public.62 Through the use of campaign
contributions, promises of future electoral favors, and even bribes,"
these special interest groups pressure legislators (who are motivated
primarily by the prospect of reelection) into enacting rent-seeking
legislation that transfers wealth from the broader public to the
interest groups.'" While public choice theory does not go so far as to
suggest that all legislation enacted will be of the rent-seeking variety,
it does contend that because of the prevalence of special interest
groups in the legislative process, such legislation will be common.
Therefore, many statutes will reflect the values of the special interests
rather than those of the public.
For theorists who subscribe to this account, the unaccountability
of judges becomes a virtue rather than a vice. Since judges are
appointed and enjoy life tenure, they are not motivated by the
concern for reelection.' As a result, unlike in the legislative process,
160 William N. Eskridge Jr, Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va L Rev 275, 322 (1988). The dynamic theory's public choice
account of the political process generally does not take into account the more sophisticated and
complex modern incarnations of public choice theory. See Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph
O'Connell, Introduction:A Brief Trajectory of Public Choice and Public Law, in Daniel A. Farber
and Anne Joseph O'Connell, eds, Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 1, 4-6
(Edward Elgar 2010) (describing the trajectory of public choice theory).
161 See Croley, Regulation and Public Interests at 18-19 (cited in note 23); Mancur Olson Jr,
The Logic of Collective Action 46-48 (Harvard 1965). See also Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 496-98 (1977); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of
Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 220-22 (Michigan 1962).
162 See Croley, Regulation and Public Interest at 19 (cited in note 23); Farber and Frickey,
65 Tex L Rev at 892 (cited in note 159).
163 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an InterestGroup Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875, 877 (1975).
164 See Farber and Frickey, 65 Tex L Rev at 878 (cited in note 159). But see Jide Nzelibe,
The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L Rev 1217, 1250
(2006) (citing studies suggesting that campaign contributions merely provide interest groups
access to legislators rather than influence the vote of legislators).
165 See, for example, Kay Lehman Schlozman, What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political
Equality and the American Pressure System, 46 J Polit 1006, 1011 (1984) (finding that "the
pressure system is heavily weighted in favor of business organizations"); Richard A. Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U Chi L Rev 263, 269
(1982) (explaining that "interest group theory does not deny the possibility that a large group ...
occasionally might procure legislation on its own behalf" and describing certain statutes that
belong in the public interest category and others that belong in the interest group category).
166 See Eskridge, 74 Va L Rev at 305 (cited in note 160).
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politically organized special interest groups do not have an advantage
over a politically unorganized public in securing favorable results in
judicial decisions."' Instead, judges decide cases in a context in which
two opposing parties each have an equal opportunity (although not
necessarily equal resources) to present their arguments to an
adjudicator who is principally motivated by a desire to influence the
direction of the law and perhaps not be overturned.6 Courts, thus, are
better institutionally positioned than the legislature to avoid results
that benefit narrow groups at the cost of the wider public.
If public choice theory has it right, as dynamic theorists suggest it
does, then it directly undermines the argument here that the Court's
practice of constitutional mainstreaming shortchanges democratic
preferences. In particular, while the judiciary's responsiveness to the
public is limited, the public is likely better off if the Court interprets
statutes according to its own emphasized constitutional norms.
Although such interpretations will at best reflect the democratic
preferences of the past, they should leave the public better off than
interpretations based on narrow special interest values that do not
reflect democratic preferences at all.
Such a public choice-theoretic account is widely subscribed to
not only by dynamic theorists, but also by legal scholars and political
scientists more generally.16 However, it has been challenged both
within and outside the legal academy. Scholars have questioned both
the empirical bases for the theory"o and its simplifying assumptions
that legislators are motivated primarily by reelection"' and that only
special interest groups seeking private gain have an organizational

167 Id at 303-04. Recent studies suggest some reasons to doubt this account. See Lee
Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Is the Roberts Court Pro-business? *1-2
(unpublished manuscript, Dec 2010), online at http://www.scribd.com/doc/50720643/EPSTEINLANDES-POSNER-Is-the-Roberts-Court-Pro-Business (visited May 11,2011).
168 See Eskridge, 74 Va L Rev at 304 (cited at note 160).
169 See Farber and O'Connell, A Brief Trajectory at 1 (cited in note 160) ("Public choice
theory plays a critical role in public law, particularly for legal scholarship and to some extent for
doctrine.").
170 See, for example, Croley, Regulation and Public Interests at 38-47 (cited in note 23);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public
Law 32-36 (Yale 1997); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest:A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U Pa L Rev 1, 7 (1990);
Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"
Practiceof the Public Choice Movement, 74 Va L Rev 199, 217-20 (1988); Farber and Frickey,
65 Tex L Rev at 893-94, (cited in note 159); Michael T. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: A
Theory of PoliticalMarkets 44-53 (Rutgers 1981).
171 See, for example, Croley, Regulation and Public Interests at 45-47 (cited in note 23);
Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice at 35 (cited in note 23).
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advantage. 71 2 1 will not attempt to rehash these arguments or to refute
public choice theory, since that exceeds what is necessary here.
Instead, I assume arguendo that the public choice account is
accurate and that most legislation constitutes a special interest
bargain. Even so, I argue that legislators have incentives to surround
special interest statutes with purposes that are public-regarding and
consistent with democratic preferences.' The Court's prioritization of
values from subsequently enacted statutes will therefore be the best
means of respecting evolving democratic preferences. It is not the
details of the legislation that matter for my argument; it is the broader
values embodied in the legislation. Thus, when the Court dynamically
interprets ambiguous statutes in unforeseen contexts, it is the more
broadly articulated purposes underlying subsequently enacted statutes
that should inform the Court's interpretation.
For example, we might assume that the 2006 VRA
Reauthorization Act constituted a special interest bargain between
legislators and a civil rights lobby that promised campaign
contributions and future electoral support in return.' Even so, it is the
more broadly articulated purpose of providing opportunities for
minority voting and representation found in the statute-in the
preface or description of purpose-and in the legislative history
surrounding the statute that a court will be able to identify and use in
the interpretation of related ambiguous statutes over time."' The
suggestion here is that the Court, when interpreting related
ambiguous statutes, should rely on these public-regarding purposes as
relatively accurate indicia of democratic preferences. I explain my
reasoning below.
There are two key questions that arise from the public choice
account: First, why would reelection-minded legislators surround
special interest statutes with public-regarding purposes? Second, how
likely are these purposes to reflect evolving democratic preferences?
There are two categories of special interest legislation: open-explicit
statutes that are "naked, undisguised wealth transfers to a particular,
favored group" and hidden-implicit statutes "couched in public
Croley, Regulation and Public Interests at 40-44 (cited in note 23).
Jonathan Macey and others have argued that even under the public choice-theoretic
account, legislators will articulate broader public-regarding purposes for special interest statutes
that are inconsistent with the special interest goals. See Macey, 86 Colum L Rev at 251-53 (cited
in note 24). See also Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 586-87 (cited in note 161). The
analysis here builds on these contributions.
174 See generally VRA Reauthorization Act of 2006,120 Stat 577,42 USC § 1973 et seq.
175 See VRA Reauthorizaton Act of 2006 § 2(b), 120 Stat at 577-78 (reporting congressional
findings and purposes); VRA Reauthorization Act of 2006 Senate Committee Report, S Rep
No 102-295 at 2 (cited in note 7) (describing the purpose of the Voting Rights Act).
172
173
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interest terms."' The cost of political information for voters is the
critical variable in determining which types of special interest statutes
legislators will enact."' If, on the one hand, political information is
costly and therefore narrowly distributed to the public, then legislators
will perceive minimal reelection costs from enacting open-explicit
special interest statutes and will rarely enact special interest statutes
hidden behind a veil of public-regarding purposes. When legislators do
seek to enact hidden-implicit statutes, they will not be attempting to
deceive the broader public but only a small segment of elites and rival
special interest groups. The public-regarding purposes, to the extent
that there are any, will therefore not be broadly responsive to
democratic preferences.
If, on the other hand, political information is cheap and broadly
distributed to the public, then legislators will have strong incentives to
hide their special interest deals to avoid voter backlash. Under this
scenario, the public that the legislator seeks to deceive with the public
interest facade will include the broader public rather than just rival
special interest groups or the elites since members of the broader
public will be able to learn about such deals relatively easily.
So the pivotal question is this: How hard is it for voters to acquire
political information? In the 1950s, when campaign speeches on the
radio and in newspapers served as the primary source of political
information for voters, it was difficult."' This information was costly in
terms of time and attention needed to comprehend and digest it. As a
result, it was only narrowly distributed to an attentive elite public."9
By the 1960s, however, television had overcome newspapers as the
chief source of political information."' The subsequent emergence of
the televised political advertisement as the central tool of modern

Macey, 86 Colum L Rev at 232-33 (cited in note 24).
The public choice account implicitly relies on the premise that the unorganized public
consists of politically apathetic, ignorant individuals. This assumption is derived from the theory
of rational-voter apathy first developed by Anthony Downs in the 1950s. See Anthony Downs,
An Economic Theory of Democracy 38-50 (Harper & Brothers 1957). As he explained, acquiring
political information is costly, and it is often incomplete. Id at 46. As a result, potential voters are
uncertain about what decisions the governing party has made or what decisions it or the
opposing party will make after an election. Id at 46-47. In addition, and perhaps more
importantly, potential voters will often not be able to trace how these decisions have impacted or
will impact their personal utility. Id at 46.
17 See Paul F Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice: How
the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a PresidentialCampaign 120-29 (Columbia 3d ed 1968).
179 Id at 124-25.
180 See Tien-Tsung Lee and Lu Wei, How Newspaper Readership Affects Political
Participation,29 Newspaper Rsrch J 8, 9 (Summer 2008); Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto
Iyengar, Going Negative: How Attack Ads Shrink and Polarize the Electorate 1 (Free Press 1995).
176
177
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political campaigns made this form of acquiring political information
nearly costless in terms of time and attention required to receive it."
Not only are political advertisements virtually costless to
potential voters, there is evidence that they provide voters with useful
political information. The early conventional wisdom from studies
conducted in the 1940s and 1950s was that the effect of media on
political learning was minimal.'2 However, in a pathbreaking study
performed during the 1972 presidential campaign, Thomas Patterson
and Robert McClure undermined this account as applied to televised
political advertisements." Voters who had a high exposure to the ads
"showed a greater increase in knowledge than persons with low
exposure."184 This gain in knowledge came despite the advertisements'
brevity and narrow focus on issues potentially helpful to the candidate
and harmful to the opponent.' The advertisements were effective
because they were abundant and they provided potential voters with
the opportunity to efficiently identify differences between candidates'
policies in terms of their effect on the potential voters' well-being.
More recent studies confirm these early findings.' As one study
concluded, "if the political diet of most Americans is lacking in crucial
information, campaign ads represent the multivitamins of American
politics."... These subsequent studies also contributed two additional
findings. First, political advertisements in congressional campaigns
provide a greater information boost for less educated and less
politically attentive individuals than they do for more educated and
181 See Ansolabehere and lyengar, Going Negative at 52-54 (cited in note 180) (showing
evidence that despite the opportunity to channel surf, political advertisements reach
"uniniterested and unmotivated citizens [] who ordinarily pay little attention to news reports,
debates, and other campaign events").
182 See Larry M. Bartels, Messages Received: The PoliticalImpact of Media Exposure, 87 Am Polit
Sci Rev 267,267 (1993) (citing and quoting studies finding a minimal effect of media on voting).
183 See Thomas E. Patterson and Robert D. McClure, The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of
Television Power in NationalPolitics 21-24 (Paragon 1976).
184 Id at 116-17.
185 See id at 117.
186 See id at 116. See also Ansolabehere and lyengar, Going Negative at 60 (cited in
note 180) (explaining that because of individuals' short attention span for political information,
"[t]he brevity of the advertising message may actually strengthen its information value" and that
voters prefer information that is easy to digest and simple to obtain).
187 See Paul Freedman, Michael Franz, and Kenneth Goldstein, CampaignAdvertising and
Democratic Citizenship, 48 Am J Polit Sci 723, 726 (2004); Craig Leonard Brians and Martin P.
Wattenberg, Campaign Issue Knowledge and Salience: Comparing Reception from TV
Commercials, TV News and Newspapers, 40 Am J Polit Sci 172, 172 (1996); Ansolabehere and
Iyengar, Going Negative at 38-39 (cited in note 180); Marion Just, Ann Crigler, and Lori Wallach,
Thirty Seconds or Thirty Minutes: What Viewers Learn from Spot Advertisements and Candidate
Debates, 40 J Communication 120, 127 (1990). But see Gregory A. Huber and Kevin Arceneaux,
Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presidential Advertising, 51 Am J Polit Sci 957,965 (2007).
188 Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein, 48 Am J Polit Sci at 725 (cited in note 187).
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more politically attentive individuals.' Second, potential voters derive
most of their information about the issues from negative
advertisements-advertisements that either offer a contrast between
the issue positions of the two candidates or simply criticize the
position of the opponent-as opposed to positive ones, which tend to
be focused less on the issues and more on the image of the candidate
paying for the ad." This finding is especially important because with
the exception of one prominent, outlier study,' it has been shown that
those with greater exposure to negative advertisements are more
likely to vote than those with less exposure.
wide distribution of political
Political advertisements'
information thus creates incentives for legislators to at least try to
deceive the public into viewing them as acting in the public interest.
Of course, under the public choice account, the availability of cheap,
broadly distributed political information does not necessarily mean
that the rational legislator will stop enacting special interest, rentseeking legislation. The reelection benefits of campaign contributions
from special interest groups and their use in funding political
advertisements and get-out-the-vote operations may outweigh the
potential costs in terms of the relatively small loss of votes from the
public that will penalize legislators for enacting such legislation.
However, a rational legislator will look to minimize any reelection
costs that could result from the passage of rent-seeking legislation.
The concern for a legislator is that a potential future political
opponent will be able to use information about the incumbent's
189 See Ansolabehere and lyengar, Going Negative at 54-55 (cited in note 180) (finding
initial results but diminishing returns in advertising).
190See, for example, Steven E. Finkel and John G. Geer, A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on
the Demobilizing Effect ofAttack Advertising,42 Am J Polit Sci 573,577 (1998).
191 See Ansolabehere and lyengar, Going Negative at 99-109 (cited in note 180).
192 For findings that negative advertisements have a mobilizing effect, see Freedman, Franz,
and Goldstein, 48 Am J Polit Sci at 732-33 (cited in note 187); Paul S. Martin, Inside the Black
Box of Negative Campaign Effects: Three Reasons Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize, 25 Polit
Psych 545, 552-57 (2004); Ken Goldstein and Paul Freedman, Campaign Advertising and Voter
Turnout: New Evidence for a Stimulation Effect, 64 J Polit 721, 733-35 (2002); Richard R. Lau
and Gerald M. Pomper, Effects of Negative Campaigning on Turnout in US Senate Elections,
1988-1998, 63 J Polit 804, 816-17 (2001); Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenney, Do Negative
Campaigns Mobilize or Suppress Turnout? Clarifying the Relationship between Negativity and
Participation,93 Am Polit Sci Rev 877,883 (1999); Paul Freedman and Ken Goldstein, Measuring
Media Exposure and the Effects of Negative CampaignAds, 43 Am J Polit Sci 1189, 1202 (1999).
For findings that negative advertisements do not have a demobilizing effect on voters, see
Deborah Jordan Brooks, The Resilient Voter: Moving toward Closure in the Debate over Negative
Campaigning and Turnout, 68 J Polit 684, 691-92 (2006); Martin P. Wattenberg and Craig
Leonard Brians, Negative Campaign Advertising: Demobilizer or Mobilizer?, 93 Am Polit Sci
Rev 891,892-95 (1999); Richard R. Lau, et al, The Effects of Negative PoliticalAdvertisements:A
Meta-analyticAssessment, 93 Am Polit Sci Rev 851, 858 (1998); Finkel and Geer, 42 Am J Polit
Sci at 584 (cited in note 190).
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support for rent-seeking legislation to galvanize the public against
her.19 3 To decrease this risk, it is rational for legislators to ensure that
the content of most special interest deals is hidden behind a public
interest facade even if the facade increases the uncertainty to special
interest groups about how the statute will be interpreted by courts and
agencies. Thus, legislators should strongly prefer hidden-implicit
special interest statutes that include a public-regarding purpose over
the alternative open-explicit special interest statutes.
Importantly, to be effective as a facade to impress voters, the
public-regarding purpose must reflect what legislators perceive to be
the democratic preferences of the broader public. This is not to
suggest that the public-regarding purposes will always accurately
reflect these preferences; legislators may be out of touch with their
constituents. But given the relatively close proximity of legislators to
public concerns and wants, they are more likely to correctly assess the
public's preferences than are judges.1 94
Thus, the broad, costless distribution to potential voters of
relevant political information in the form of political advertisements,
combined with the motivation of legislators to be reelected, suggests
that the public-regarding purposes underlying statutes will tend to
accord with democratic preferences. In sum, even if we assume that
the most cynical account of the political process is correct, evolving
statute-based values are still a good indicator of evolving democratic
preferences. In the next Section, I describe the methodology that the
Court should use to interpret ambiguous statutes in light of those
evolving statute-based values.
B.

Toward a Modified Dynamic Approach to Statutory Interpretation

In this Section, I argue that the Court should prioritize values
underlying subsequently enacted statutes when interpreting

193 See Arnold, The Logic of CongressionalAction at 30 (cited in note 157) (noting the role
of a political instigator in mobilizing previously inattentive publics).
194 This argument is borne out by studies showing that the public perceives elected officials
as generally being responsive to their preferences in their roll call votes and enacted policies.
See, for example, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, The Macro Polity at 316 (cited in note 151);
Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy:Public Opinion
and Policy in the American States 78, 80-81 (Cambridge 1993); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y.
Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 Am Polit Sci Rev 175, 179 (1983). But see Alan
D. Monroe, Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993, 62 Pub Opinion Q 6, 12-13 (1998);
Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress,57 Am Polit Sci Rev 45,
48 (1963). For a discussion of the limitations of the studies, see Benjamin Page, The Semi-sovereign
Public,in Jeff Manza, Fay Lomax Cook, and Benjamin I. Page, eds, Navigating Public Opinion 325,
326 (Oxford 2002); Paul Burstein, Why Estimates of the Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy
Are Too High: Empiricaland TheoreticalImplications,84 Soc Forces 2273,2286 (2006).
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ambiguous statutes in unforeseen contexts. This method will usually
result in interpretations consistent with the dynamic conception of
legislative supremacy-that is, interpretations that reflect both the
legislative will and the preferences of the broader public. To help
contextualize my proposed method, I first describe alternative
proposals recently suggested by other scholars. I then explain my
method in more detail and how it differs from these proposals.
The early dynamic theorists failed to articulate a clear method for
deriving statute-based values or interpreting ambiguous statutes to
accord with these values. However, two statutory interpretation
scholars, Amanda Frost and Einer Elhauge, have more recently
proposed interpretive approaches that are useful starting points for a
modified dynamic approach that prioritizes statute-based values.'95
Frost has offered an extremely innovative proposal, suggesting that
when the Court is faced with an ambiguous statute in a context not
foreseen by the enacting legislature, it should simply certify the
question to Congress.' Congress would then have the opportunity to
amend the statute, and when it does the Court should apply the new
law to resolve the pending case.' This proposal implicitly relies on the
formal dynamic conception of legislative supremacy and its idea that
current congressional preferences should determine the meaning of
ambiguous statutes in unforeseen contexts. But the approach raises
two important questions. First, since Congress cannot be forced to
respond to the certified question, is it likely to respond given time and
resource pressures? Frost's solution might be ideal in a world where
Congress would actually consistently respond, but the likelihood of
that seems low. Second, assuming that Congress does respond to the
certified question, would this response lead to interpretations that
accord with evolving democratic preferences?
If we view the political process through either the representativegovernment lens or the optimistic pluralist lens, then the Frost
proposal is attractive. These accounts suggest that the products of the
legislative process, which presumably would include responses to
certified questions, are responsive to democratic preferences. But if we
assume, as dynamic theorists traditionally have, that the public choicetheoretic account is an accurate description of the political process,
then there will be strong reasons to question whether the
congressional answer to the certified question will in fact be
responsive to democratic preferences. Instead, it is likely that the
195 See Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress,101 Nw U L Rev 1, 24-25 (2007);
Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules at 8 (cited in note 14).
196 Frost, 101 Nw U L Rev at 6-8 (cited in note 195).
197 Id at 7.
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content of such legislation will, like other legislation, reflect what
particularly powerful and organized special interest groups want and
are willing to provide campaign contributions to legislators to
support. Since most Supreme Court decisions involving statutory
interpretation tend to have limited political salience,' all that
legislators would need to do to cloak their rent-seeking amendment
would be to surround it with a public-regarding purpose. But this
public-regarding purpose will do little to ameliorate the harm to the
public interest brought about by a statutory amendment that serves
special interests and has precedential effect for future judicial
decisions interpreting the statute.
Separately, there is the problem of what the Court should do
when Congress does not respond (and even Frost concedes that this
will often be the case). Frost contends that congressional silence
should be viewed "as an implicit delegation of legislative power to the
courts" and that judges would be justified "engag[ing] in ...
freewheeling and creative readings of legislation."... This embrace of
unconstrained judicial creativity in the interpretation of statutes is
rather unappealing, given that the certification proposal is itself
implicitly premised on legislative supremacy.
Einer Elhauge offers an alternative that is more consistent with
the formal dynamic conception of legislative supremacy, insofar as it
looks to the official actions (or lack thereof) of the legislature as its
chief guide, without relying on judicial creativity to fill the breach.
Elhauge's normative and descriptive starting point is that courts adopt
a set of interpretive default rules for ambiguous statutes that will tend
to maximize "political satisfaction."200 Since politicians prefer present
influence over all statutes to future influence over a subset of statutes,
he contends that the default rules that maximize political satisfaction
are ones that accord with current enactable preferences. 0 ' These
preferences, Elhauge explains, are "reliably ascertained from official
action," which includes "subsequent legislative statutes that help
reveal current enactable preferences even though they do not amend

198 See James W. Stoutenborough, Donald P. Haider-Markel, and Mahalley D. Allen,
Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases,
59 Polit Rsrch Q 419,420 (2006) (citing studies showing that "the public is poorly informed about
the Court"). For a classic account, see Walter E Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion
and the United States Supreme Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisitesfor Court Legitimation of
Regime Changes, 2 L & Socy Rev 357, 360-64 (1968) (finding from a survey that the political
salience of Supreme Court decisions is low).
199 Frost, 101 Nw U L Rev at 6 (cited in note 195).
200 Elhauge,StatutoryDefault Rules at 4 (cited in note 14).

201 Id at 42.
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the relevant provision."20 2 He cites two primary examples of default
rules that are employed by the court to satisfy current enactable
preferences: (1) the presumption that a prior interpretation of a
statute is correct if it has been brought to the attention of the
legislature and it has chosen not to amend the statute, and (2) the
Supreme Court's occasional reliance on "legislative history underlying
subsequent legislation."20
Elhauge's approach is a good first step toward a modified
dynamic approach to statutory interpretation, but it does not go far
enough. It is a good first step because the Court's employment of
post-enactment legislative history to interpret ambiguous statutes in
unforeseen contexts will usually result in interpretations consistent
with the dynamic conception of legislative supremacy. Legislators
generally construct a public interest facade for rent-seeking statutes
via statements in committee reports, legislative sponsor statements
about the purpose of the bill, and the preface and the description of
purposes contained in many statutes.
Elhauge's suggestion is too limited in scope, though, because it
apparently reaches only post-enactment legislative history directly
concerned with the provision being interpreted. The Court's approach
to using post-enactment legislative history has generally been
similarly limited. For example, the Court will at times give weight to a
post-enactment committee report to a bill amending another
provision that includes statements about the legislative intent of the
statutory provision being interpreted.24
The Court, however, should not limit its universe to postenactment statements of purpose about the statutory provision being
interpreted. The modified dynamic statutory approach that I propose
here suggests that the Court look also to the purposes underlying
other subsequently enacted statutes insofar as they are related to the
statute being interpreted. These purposes underlying related
subsequently enacted statutes provide the Court with a broader set of
sources to ascertain evolving democratic preferences. That broader set
of materials will lessen the Court's need both to defer to agency
interpretations, which tend to be a less reliable source of these
preferences, and to rely on its own constitutional norms.
To illustrate how the Court might use related subsequently
enacted statutes, consider the Court's statutory interpretation in Bob

202
203
204

Id at 9.
Id at 71-74.
See, for example, Andrus v Shell Oil Co, 446 US 657,666 n 8 (1980).
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Jones University v United States.205 In Bob Jones, the Court addressed
the question whether Bob Jones University was a "charitable"
organization and thus entitled to tax-exempt status under 26 USC
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,2 0 which was first enacted in
1894.207 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had determined that
because the university prohibited interracial dating and marriage, it
was no longer entitled to a tax exemption; the university challenged
that determination.20 The Supreme Court agreed with the IRS. The
Court first determined that an organization could not be considered
charitable if it engaged in activity contrary to fundamental public
policy.209 It then relied in part on subsequently enacted statutes,
including Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968210 (the
Fair Housing Act), and the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972211 as
evidence that Bob Jones was not charitable, because these statutes
reflected a legislative "agreement that racial discrimination in
education violates a fundamental public policy."2 21
The Court in Bob Jones thus derived values from other
subsequently enacted statutes because the purposes underlying them
related to the interpretive ambiguity. But how does the Court know
which subsequently enacted statutes are sufficiently related to the
statute at hand? It should rely on other statutes when they express
evolving public values at a level of specificity that can usefully inform
the Court's interpretation of the ambiguous statute. For example, in
Bob Jones the value of racial nondiscrimination expressed in the civil
rights statutes cited by the Court was sufficiently specific to inform the
question of whether Bob Jones could still be considered a charitable
organization while barring interracial dating and marriage. We could
imagine other congressional enactments, such as environmental or
copyright statutes, that would be insufficiently related because they
would not provide any guidance to the Court on the meaning of the

205 461 US 574 (1983). For an illuminating account on the background of Bob Jones, see
generally Olatunde Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion,
and Congress' Extraordinary Acquiescence, in William N. Eskridge Jr, Philip P Frickey, and
Elizabeth Garrett, eds, Statutory Interpretation Stories 127 (Foundation 2011).
206 Bob Jones, 461 US at 577.
207 Act of August 27,1894, ch 349,28 Stat 509.
208 Bob Jones, 461 US at 580-82.
209 Id at 592.

210 Pub L No 90-284, title VIII, 82 Stat 81, codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq.
211 Pub L No 92-318, title VII, 86 Stat 354, repealed by Emergency School Aid Act of 1978,
Pub L No 95-561, 92 Stat 2252, codified at 20 USC § 3191 et seq.
212 Bob Jones, 461 US at 594.
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ambiguous term "charitable" in § 501(c)(3) and its application to
institutional acts of racial discrimination.
When examining the relevant subsequently enacted statutes, the
Court should give relatively more weight to more recent enactments
since they better reflect current values. While the Court's universe of
potentially related, subsequently enacted statutes should include all
relevant statutes enacted subsequent to the ambiguous statute at
hand, the Court should employ a sliding scale in which it gives values
from older related statutes less weight than values from more recent
statutes. To the extent that the values from related subsequently
enacted statutes conflict, the Court should therefore prioritize the
values reflected in the most recently enacted statutes since they are
more likely to be consistent with current preferences.
But is the Court really able to discern which statutes are
sufficiently related to the one at hand to serve as interpretive guides?
Further, is the Court competent to identify statutory meaning on the
basis of sources outside its own work product, such as subsequently
enacted statutes, or will it simply be guessing as to what interpretation
would best accord with statute-based values? When answering these
questions, it is important to note that when the Court tries to ascertain
which values from which related statutes would be useful, it is not
interpreting statutes in a vacuum. Prior to even considering evolving
statute-based values, the Court will have narrowed the possible
meanings of the statute through its examination of the text of the
statute, as well as the intent and the purposes of the enacting
legislature. What likely remains after this examination is a narrower
set of questions for which only a narrow set of related statutes would
provide useful evidence of statute-based values. The competency
concerns associated with the indeterminacy of the Court looking to
related statutes are therefore greatly diminished.
Once the Court has suitably narrowed the range of possible
meanings, requiring the Court to identify evolving statute-based
values from the context and deliberations surrounding subsequently
enacted statutes does not raise any new competency concerns beyond
those raised by other approaches to statutory interpretation. Any
archaeological approach to statutory interpretation, such as
intentionalism or purposivism, requires, as would the modified
dynamic approach, that the Court look to the broad, general intent or
purpose of the legislature. The only difference is that in the traditional
context, the Court looks for this general intent or purpose in the
statements of the enacting legislature, while in the dynamic context,
the Court looks for this same information from statements of
subsequent legislatures.
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Finally, what should the Court do when statute-based values fail
to provide answers to the interpretive question? There are at least
three possible reasons for such a failure. First, statute-based values
from related subsequently enacted statutes could be too general to
provide guidance on which of the multiple interpretive possibilities
the Court should choose. Second, statute-based values from related
subsequently related statutes might conflict. And finally, there will be
contexts in which the Court is unable to identify any relevant statutebased values because there are no subsequently enacted statutes
related to the interpretive question.
The simple answer is that, under my approach, subsequently
enacted statutes are not the only legitimate interpretive source. As
recognized by dynamic statutory interpretation theory, agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes are another source of statutebased values. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, I expect
in future work to consider the weight that the Court should give to
agency interpretations relative to judicially emphasized constitutional
values. Further, although I have critiqued the Court's constitutional
mainstreaming of statutes, my modified dynamic approach suggests
only a prioritization of statute-based values-not that judicially
emphasized constitutional norms are irrelevant. Thus, when statutebased values from subsequently enacted statutes or even agency
interpretations fail to provide the Court with interpretive guidance, it
should then look to Constitution-based values. As detailed in Part II,
the Court's emphasized constitutional norms will likely still be related,
although often with a lag, to evolving democratic preferences.
IV THREE OBJECTIONS
My argument against constitutional mainstreaming and the
contention that the Court should prioritize statute-based values over
its own emphasized constitutional norms is subject to at least three
major objections. The first objection is that the prioritization of
statute-based values ignores the fact that Constitution-based values
are derived from our fundamental law and validated by a past
supermajority. The second objection is that the prioritization of
statute-based values may result in the underprotection of already
underenforced constitutional norms. The third objection is that
constitutional mainstreaming serves an important prophylactic
function, which is to keep statutes out of a zone of potential
unconstitutionality.
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The first objection derives from dynamic theorists' argument that
Constitution-based values should have a "special coercive force" in
the interpretation of ambiguous statutes.213 Insofar as dynamic
theorists are suggesting that the Court should interpret a statute so
that it is constitutional, we are in agreement. But it is doubtful that
this is the extent of their argument. If dynamic theory's prioritization
of Constitution-based values were premised on such an
uncontroversial argument, then the hierarchy of public values would
be redundant to the traditional constitutional avoidance canon and
not really worth a mention.214 Instead, dynamic theory's prioritization
of Constitution-based values must be read as requiring something
more. Particularly, it is an argument that because the Constitution is
the fundamental representation of our values as reflected in its
validation by a past supermajority of the people, the values underlying
it should be positively promoted in the interpretation of ambiguous
statutes regardless of whether the Constitution actually requires such
an interpretation."'
The problem is that constitutional values are mediated through
the decisions of the Supreme Court. Its interpretations sometimes
define the values contained in constitutional provisions; often they
simply balance these values when they conflict. Which one of the
conflicting constitutional values the Court chooses to emphasize
depends, of course, on the value orientation of the majority of the
justices on the Court at any particular point in time. Thus, as discussed
previously, for the Warren Court, the congressional authority to
enforce individual rights was frequently weighed more heavily than
federalism when these two values conflicted, whereas in the
Rehnquist Court, the opposite weighing occurred.2 6 The changes in
emphasis by different Courts did not mean that the deemphasized
constitutional value suddenly lacked past supermajoritarian support; it
meant simply that one constitutional value emerged as more
important to the Court than the other because of the Court's
composition.
Critically, then, when the Court is faced with the question
whether to engage in the constitutional mainstreaming of a statute, it

Eskridge, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1019 (cited in note 15).
For a description of the classic avoidance canon, see notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
215 Implicit within this idea is the view of the Constitution as a source of positive values
with a supermajoritarian pedigree as opposed to a source of negative constraints on government
action. If dynamic scholars understood the Constitution as simply a set of negative constraints on
government action, then the very fact that the statute-based values accord with it would be
enough to ensure that such an interpretation is consistent with Constitution-based values.
216 See notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
213

214
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is often not choosing between an interpretation that comports with
the Constitution (and thus has been validated as fundamental by a
past supermajority of the people) and an interpretation that does not.
Instead, it is choosing between two interpretations that comport with
the Constitution. It is just that one interpretation better accords with
the current Court's constitutional-value orientation than the other.
Therefore, when the Court resists the gravitational pull of the
constitutional values that it has emphasized and instead interprets
ambiguous statutes consistent with statute-based values, it is not
necessarily undermining our fundamental law. Rather, it is deferring
to a good indicator of current democratic preferences.
A second objection to the argument against constitutional
mainstreaming is that it may result in the underprotection of already
underenforced constitutional norms. Lawrence Sager developed the
concept of underenforced constitutional norms.217 This concept later
emerged as one of the main rationales underlying the use of two
primary tools of constitutional mainstreaming: the modern
constitutional avoidance canon and the clear statement rule to protect
federalism values.m' Sager argued that certain institutionalcompetency concerns related to expertise, experience, and the need
for judicially manageable standards limit the Court's ability to enforce
particular constitutional norms to their conceptual limit." These
norms, he suggested, should nonetheless be regarded as legally valid
up to the conceptual limit because it is incongruous to treat "federal
courts restrain[ing] themselves for reasons of competence and
institutional propriety rather than reasons of constitutional
substance ... as

authoritative

determinations

of

constitutional

substance."220
Relying on Sager's conceptual point, proponents of particular
tools of constitutional mainstreaming have justified their use as a
means of protecting underenforced constitutional norms.22 Ernest
Young has argued that, in addition to the familiar means of enforcing

217 See Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of UnderenforcedConstitutional
Norms, 91 Hary L Rev 1212,1213 (1978).
218 See also Sunstein, 103 Hary L Rev at 469 (cited in note 14) (describing a function of the
avoidance canon as strengthening judicially underenforced constitutional norms).
219 Sager, 91 Harv L Rev at 1220-26 (cited in note 218).
220 Id at 1226. Sager analogized to the political question doctrine, in which the Court often
limits its enforcement of a particular constitutional norm on the basis of institutional concerns
about the absence of a judicially manageable standard. He notes that in this context, the
statement of judicial incompetency is generally not considered an "authoritative statement about
.
the norm itself." Id.
221 See Young, 78 Tex L Rev at 1604-06 (cited in note 95); Frickey, 93 Cal L Rev at 402
(cited in note 95).
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the Constitution through the invalidation norm of judicial review, the
Court also enforces the Constitution through "resistance norms" like
the modern constitutional avoidance canon and the clear statement
rules.22 These resistance norms serve as soft limits on government
authority to act by making it "harder-but still not impossible-for
Congress to write statutes that intrude into areas of constitutional
sensitivity."223 Young suggests that the establishment of these soft limits
on government authority is particularly appropriate in areas in which
there are likely to be underenforced constitutional norms. These
include contexts in which there are difficult line-drawing problems or
when "we can expect political safeguards to play the primary role in
protecting the underlying constitutional values."224
Although Young recognizes that enforcement through resistance
norms still involves the Court in constitutional judgments in areas in
which Sager suggested it lacks institutional competency, he argues that
these constitutional judgments are more tolerable because Congress
can override them.22 He also explains that the enforcement of
resistance norms through canons "facilitate[s] the operation of political
checks" by making clear to actors in the political process that
constitutional values are at stake and by creating additional costs for
the passage of legislation that touches upon constitutionally sensitive
226
areas.
From this perspective, the prioritization of statute-based values
might be objectionable because it would theoretically lead to the
further underenforcement of certain constitutional norms. Insofar as
statutory interpretation canons are used to protect underenforced
constitutional norms, they should be prioritized over evolving statutebased values because these underenforced norms are fundamental
and reflect enduring public values that cannot be properly defended
through judicial review.
This objection is a substantial one, but positing that judges should
enforce underenforced constitutional norms through canons of
See Young,78 Tex L.Rev at 1593-96 (cited in note 95).
Id at 1596. Young specifically describes the use of the modern avoidance canon and clear
statement rules as important tools for protecting structural norms, which "rarely serve as a basis
for invalidating federal legislation." Id at 1606. This view of underenforced constitutional norms
contrasts sharply with Sager's conception, which focuses on the norms underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. See Sager,
91 Harv L Rev at 1218-20 (cited in note 218). These contrasting positions demonstrate that
whether a particular constitutional norm is underenforced, and specifically whether statutes
intrude into constitutionally sensitive areas, can often depend on one's views about the
importance of that particular norm.
224 Young, 78 Tex L Rev at 1603 (cited in note 95).
225 Id at 1607.
226 Id at 1608-09.
222
223

1256

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:1203

construction is a particularly significant and perhaps questionable
departure from Sager. Sager recognized that because of institutional
competency concerns, the Court was not well situated to enforce the
underenforced constitutional norms that he was concerned about.
Instead, he argued that the legislative and executive branches have to
be trusted to establish the constitutional limits and to adjust their
actions to accord with these limits. As Sager wrote, "[The] obligation
to obey constitutional norms at their unenforced margins requires
government officials to fashion their own conceptions of these norms
and measure their conduct by reference to these conceptions."227
If, as Sager pointed out, underenforced norms are not enforced to
their limits precisely because the Court is not institutionally equipped
to do so, it is not clear why in areas of underenforcement we should be
less troubled by the Court enforcing the Constitution through soft
limits of resistance norms. The judiciary in the context of drawing soft
limits must still engage in a line-drawing exercise to determine which
interpretations raise constitutional doubt or what contexts are
appropriate for clear statement rules-a line-drawing exercise that is
ultimately not that different from assessing whether a particular
interpretation of a statute is unconstitutional.
Arguably, the line drawing matters less when soft limits are
enforced. The legislature could always reenact the interpretation that
pushes the statute beyond the judicially enforced limits; this is
something the legislature cannot do when the Court enforces the
Constitution through the hard limits of judicial invalidation. Upon
closer examination, though, even these differences in the
consequences of line drawing through resistance norms and
invalidation norms are greatly overstated.
I have already argued that overrides are exceedingly rare and
that the legislature does not often override judicial interpretations of
statutes even when they are contrary to the preferences of the
majority of the legislature.228 The probability of an override is further
diminished when the Court uses resistance norms in its interpretation
of ambiguous statutes. By asserting that a particular interpretation
that accords with current legislative preferences raises constitutional
doubt, the Court deters Congress from overriding the Court's
interpretation for fear that such an override will likely be
invalidated.229 Rather than spurring dialogue between the Court and
Sager, 91 Harv L Rev at 1227 (cited in note 218).
See notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
229 See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 S Ct Rev 71,88; Alexander M. Bickel
and Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case,
71 Hary L Rev 1, 34 (1957).
227
228
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Congress through the establishment of soft limits on government
conduct, the avoidance canon instead actually discourages such
dialogue because of the "common perception [derived from the
principle of judicial supremacy] that the Supreme Court has the 'last
word' in the constitutional dialogue."2 3 Thus, while Young relies on
overrides as a means by which the legislature can achieve its goals
after the Court enforces the Constitution through resistance norms,
even he concedes that judicial reliance on Constitution-based canons
has a "'go ahead make my day' quality to it" that makes such
overrides extremely unlikely."' The effects of the Court's imposition of
soft limits on government authority through resistance norms
therefore become very similar to the effects of its imposition of hard
limits on government authority through invalidation. And if we are
concerned about the Court's institutional competency to implement
underenforced constitutional norms, then the active judicial
enforcement of norms that the Court is not particularly competent to
enforce and to which the legislature is not likely to respond is a very
problematic solution.
Instead, in the areas where institutional competence constrains
the judiciary from enforcing the Constitution to its limit, the
legislative and executive branches' conceptions of these limits should
control. In other words, the Court should defer to the judgments of
the legislative and executive branches in these areas. This means that
it is appropriate for the Court to prioritize evolving statute-based
values even if we understand canons as tools by which the Court seeks
to protect underenforced constitutional norms. Evolving statute-based
values will have the advantage of reflecting the conceptions of the
branches of government that have the comparatively greater
competence in these constitutional domains.
A final and related objection to the prioritization of statute-based
values is that since it can result in interpretations that are on the
constitutional fringe, constitutional mainstreaming serves as a
necessary prophylactic tool that protects the constitutional core.232 To
understand this objection and the problems with it, it is necessary to
examine the use of prophylactic rules in another context.

230 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's
Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns,30 UC Davis L Rev 1,19-20 (1996).
231 Young,78 Tex L Rev at 1581 (cited in note 95).
232 Such an objection is implicit in one of Sunstein's arguments for prioritizing Constitutionbased values. He argues that "pushing statutes away from constitutionally troublesome ground
[ Iprovides a way for courts to vindicate constitutionally based norms and does so in a way that
is less intrusive than constitutional adjudication." Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 468 (cited in
note 14).
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In constitutional law, a prophylactic rule is a court-created rule
that adds a layer of safeguards to constitutional rights but "that can be
violated without violating the Constitution itself."233 The Court created
the paradigmatic prophylactic rule in Miranda v Arizona,342 a case in
which the Court established the requirement that police officers notify
arrestees of their rights prior to questioning.25 The notification acted
as an additional safeguard against the violation of the arrestee's "Fifth
Amendment right to be free from compulsion to testify against
oneself."236 The prophylactic rule in this context functioned as a more
administrable, easy-to-follow rule that "overprotect[s] a constitutional
right because a narrow, theoretically more discriminating rule may not
work in practice. 237 Thus, in Miranda, the Court traded a very hard
line-drawing problem of determining at what point an arrestee has
been compelled to incriminate himself for an easier one in which
compulsion is essentially assumed when the police officer fails to
instruct the arrestee of his rights.
In contrast to the Miranda rule, constitutional mainstreaming
serves as an inappropriate and potentially dangerous prophylactic
tool. It is inappropriate because an interpretation of a statute that
avoids potentially constitutionally troublesome grounds will not
inherently result in a more administrable, easy-to-follow rule for
Congress, if it in fact decides to revisit the statute in the future. When
the Court pushes statutes into the constitutional mainstream, it
creates a penumbra of constitutional meaning with blurry edges,
rather than a clear rule. For example, explaining that a statute raises
serious constitutional questions, as the Court does with the modern
constitutional avoidance canon, provides the legislature with very
little guidance about what changes to the statute would be
constitutional. Instead, to establish a clear rule the Court should use
233 Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's ConstitutionalDifficulties:A Reply to ProfessorSchulhofer,
55 U Chi L Rev 174,177 (1988). See also Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding ConstitutionalRights:
The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 Tenn L Rev 925, 925 (1999); Joseph D. Grano,
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure:A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw U L
Rev 100, 105 (1985); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:
ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 Hary L Rev 1,21 (1975).
234 384 US 436 (1966).
235 Id at 444-45. See also Grano, 80 Nw U L Rev at 106 (cited in note 233).
236 Landsberg, 66 Tenn L Rev at 925 (cited in note 233).
237 Monaghan, 89 Hary L Rev at 21 (cited in note 233). Prophylactic rules also seek to
prevent hard-to-detect constitutional violations because of the difficulty, for example, of
ascertaining official motive or intent. See Grano, 80 Nw U L Rev at 105 (cited in note 233);
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U Chi L Rev 190,200 (1988). Consider
Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 Colum L Rev 1172, 1173 & n 3 (2010) (situating prophylactic
rules within the broader category of power rules). This function does not seem particularly
applicable in the statutory interpretation context.
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the traditional constitutional avoidance canon when an interpretation
is on the fringe of constitutionality. This canon would require the
Court to decide explicitly whether the interpretation consistent with
statute-based values is constitutional, and if it is not, to choose a fairly
8 When the Court employs
plausible alternative interpretation that is.2m
this canon, rather than the modern constitutional avoidance canon,239 it
gives clear guidance to Congress as to where the constitutional
boundary lies, so that Congress can better decide whether and how to
2
And
amend the statute to be more consistent with its preferences.40
ultimately, giving Congress greater information about what is
constitutional and what is not is a better means of protecting the
constitutional core against future legislative infringement.
In addition to its limited usefulness as a prophylactic tool,
constitutional mainstreaming is a potentially dangerous prophylactic
tool from the perspective of separation of powers. The reason is that it
allows the Court to de facto decrease the zone of what is
constitutionally permissible. This de facto contraction of what is
constitutionally permissible in turn limits the legislature's range of
choice and its opportunities to influence statutory meaning consistent
constitutional
preferences. The
democratic
with evolving
mainstreaming of statutes justified as a prophylactic tool therefore
allows the Court to "exceed[] [its] legitimate judicial role and
arrogate[] [to itself] legislative power."241
Three important points should be taken away from this
discussion. First, while the Constitution is in fact a fundamental source
of values, judicially emphasized constitutional norms often represent
the justices' own value choices regarding which constitutional values
require greater protection. Second, protecting underenforced
constitutional norms is important, but the institutions best situated to
protect these norms are the legislature and executive, not the judiciary.
Finally, constitutional mainstreaming is neither a necessary nor proper
prophylactic tool for the protection of the constitutional core.
CONCLUSION

The Court's constitutional mainstreaming of § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act in Bartlett brought the statute closer to irrelevance in the

See notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
See note 95 and accompanying text.
240 See Vermeule, 85 Georgetown L J at 1949 (cited in note 94) (distinguishing between the
modern and classic avoidance canons).
241 Landsberg, 66 Tenn L Rev at 958 (cited in note 233). See also Grano, 80 Nw U L Rev
at 123 (cited in note 233).
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changed context of 2009.24 Given the legislative articulation of a
continued need for color-conscious remedies to political inequality in
the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act just three years prior to
Bartlett, it appears that the Court did not accurately reflect the
preferences of the current Congress. And it is unlikely that a Congress
that takes months, if not years, to enact statutes will seek to amend the
statute to ensure its continued effectiveness. Thus, the ruling in Bartlett
has opened up a gap between the Act as interpreted by the Court and
evolving democratic preferences.
Yet the Court's constitutional mainstreaming of § 2 in Bartlett is
consistent with one of the primary tenets of dynamic statutory
interpretation. Since dynamic statutory interpretation is in many ways
a normatively compelling theory of how courts should interpret
statutes in contexts not foreseen by the enacting legislatures, it is
worth preserving. The problem embodied in Bartlett thus suggests the
need to modify the dynamic approach to comport with both a formal
and substantive understanding of the dynamic conception of
legislative supremacy. In particular, to make the theory more
defensible, it should be modified to achieve a greater degree of
internal consistency and to ensure interpretations of statutes that
comport with current congressional policies and evolving democratic
preferences. One step in that direction is the reprioritization of
statute-based values over judicially emphasized constitutional norms.
Which values are prioritized is not a matter of merely theoretical
importance, applicable only in rare circumstances. The gap between
statute-based values and judicially emphasized constitutional norms
will be a common result of the differences in how the justices of the
Court and the members of Congress are selected, and the difference
between the justices' life tenure and members' limited terms. In fact,
we are currently living in a context conducive to value disjuncture. The
presidency and the Senate are controlled by the Democratic Party,
which has historically supported values such as race consciousness,
expansive congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments, and a restrictive view of federalism. At the same time, a
conservative core of five justices that has emphasized a colorblind
vision of the Constitution243 and has demonstrated lukewarm
242 Residential integration is likely to continue, and despite the inspiring election of an
African American to the presidency, the trends underlying his election as well as the reaction to
his presidency indicate that racially polarized voting will continue to be an obstacle to minority
representation in the political process. See Ansolabehere, Persily, and Stewart, 123 Harv L Rev
at 1435 (cited in note 2).
243 See, for example, Bartlett, 129 S Ct at 1247-48; ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v
Seattle School DistrictNo 1, 551 US 701,747-48 (2007) (plurality).
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enthusiasm about congressional authority to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments24 controls the Supreme Court. In this
time of disjuncture, it is even more important to seek an interpretive
approach that ensures that the Court acts as a subordinate partner to
the current legislature in the hard cases of statutory interpretation.
The approach that will move the Court closer to this role is one in
which it prioritizes the values promulgated by the elected branches
and resists the gravitational pull of the constitutional mainstream.

244 See, for example, Ricci v DeStefano, 129 S Ct 2658, 2676 (2009); Northwest
Austin
Municipal Utility DistrictNumber One v Holder,129 S Ct 2504,2511-12 (2009).
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